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Adversarial Science
Sanne H. Knudsen*
ABSTRACT: Adversarial science-sometimes referred to as "litigation
science" or "junkscience"-has a bad name. It is often associated with the
tobacco industry's relentless use of science to manufacture uncertainty and
avoid liability. This Article challenges the traditional conception that
adversarialscience should be castigated simply because it was developed for
litigation. Rather, this Article urges that adversarialscience is an important
informationalasset that should, and indeed must, be embraced.
In the ecological context, adversarialscience is vital to understandingthe
ecological effects of long-term toxic exposure. Government trustees and
corporate defendants fund intensive scientific research following major
ecological disasters like oil spills as part of a process known as natural
resource damage assessment ("NRDA"). Duringthis process, lawyers engage
scientists to advance advocacy positions, either to support or to defeat claims
for naturalresource damages. The NRDA process presents an unparalleled
opportunity to intensively study the effects of toxic exposure to ecosystems at
the very moment those impacts are unfolding. At the same time, the science
that emerges is adversarial;it suffers from the same conflicts of interests and
perceptions of bias as other result-orientedscience.
While scientists and legal scholarshave written extensively about the conflicts
of interest embedded in otherforms ofpolicy-relevantscience, surprisinglylittle
scholarly attention has been given to the influence of litigation on NRDA
science or the implications of that influence on the broader scientific
understanding of ecological harms. This Article casts a bright light on
adversarialscience, using the scientific literature to expose the influence of
litigation on NRDA science. More importantly, this Article-while
acknowledging the risks of adversarial science-urges policyimakers to
embrace it. Ultimately, this Article offers solutions that both release
adversarial science from traditional clouds of suspicion and allow
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adversarialscience to inform public policy on the long-term harm from toxic

exposure.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

While no one hopes for environmental disasters, a great deal can be
learned from them. In fact, much of what we know of long-term ecological
exposure to toxins comes from studies undertaken in the wake of massive oil
spills like the Exxon Valdez or the Deepwater Horizon. In many ways, these
events-though unfortunate-present an unparalleled opportunity to
intensely study the effects of toxic exposure to ecosystems. Laboratories, for
instance, cannot replicate the conditions often needed to study the complex
response of ecosystems to toxins. Though inordinately complicated, the

ecological conditions created post-Exxon Valdez or post-DeepwaterHorizon allow
for real-time observation of the intricate and entangled ways that ecosystems
are impacted by toxic exposure. The political support for intensive scientific
inquiry is also piqued in the wake of mass-disaster events. Media attention and
public outcry combine to create a demand for comprehensive study that may
otherwise have less enthusiastic political support.
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As an example of the informational opportunities created by massdisaster events, consider the intense study of the Gulf of Mexico that is
currently underway to determine the nature and magnitude of injuries caused
by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill.' Technical working groups consisting
of government, academic, and industry scientists have been assembled to
study the ecological impacts of oil spills on a wide variety of species and their
habitats, from mudflats to corral.2 For each affected resource and habitat, the
scientific inquiry is cumbersome and detailed. Some scientists are tasked with
evaluating the impacts of oil and chemical dispersants on representative
groups of aquatic species.3 To do so, they must consider a range of exposure
pathways, including "oil droplets . . . oiled sediment, and ingestion of
contaminated prey [or] food."4 Other studies are focused on enhancing
knowledge of deepwater communities, which first requires "[m]apping softand hard-bottom habitats along the continental shelf and sea floor."5 The
amount of scientific data being generated from this collective research is
massive, 6 so much that specialized support teams have been assembled to
create and manage information databases.7
Importantly, the study in the wake of these disasters is notjust short-lived.
There is increasingly a focus on studying the long-term, chronic impacts. After
the Deepwater Horizon spill, government trustees have declared their
commitment "to a long-term assessment of the Gulf, recognizing that the

1. For a detailed discussion of the coordinated scientific research following the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, see generally NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: APRIL 2012 STATUS UPDATE FOR THE DEFWA TER HORIZONOIL SPILL (2012)

[hereinafter 2012 DEEPWATER HORIZON STATUS REPORT], available at http://www.gulfspill
restoration.noaa.gov/wp-content/uploads/FINALNRDAStatusUpdateApril 2012.pdf.
2.
Id. at 15; see also id. at 27-37 (providing additional information on the range of
resources and habitats that are being studied in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,
including: deepwater communities, water column and invertebrates, marine fish, marine
mammals, sea turtles, nearshore sediment and resources, submerged aquatic vegetation, oysters,
shallow water coral, shorelines, birds, terrestrial species, and human use).
3.

Id. at 29.

4.
5.
6.

Id. at 30.
Id.at 32.
BP reports that
[s]ince May 201o, BP has worked with state and federal trustees to develop and
implement more than 240 initial and amended work plans to study wildlife, habitat
and the recreational use of these resources. By the end of 2014, BP had spent
approximately $1.3 billion to support the assessment process.

Restoringthe Environment,BP, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/gulf-of-mexico-restoration/
restoring-the-environment.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
7. 2012 DEEPWA TER HORIZON STATUS REPORT, supra note i, at 28 ("[T~he data management
team has been working to collect, record and assimilate the thousands of environmental samples,
analytical and observational records.").
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DeepwaterHorizon oil spill will affect the region's natural resources for years to
come."8 This is an area where deep study is historically lacking.
While certainly intensive, there may be an important caveat to the
learning opportunities presented by events like the Exxon Valdez or Deepwater
Horizon spills. Notably, these extensive scientific studies are undertaken
through a process known as natural resource damage assessment ("NRDA").9
Government trustees prepare NRDAs in the wake of oil spills and toxicsubstance releases. Trustees use these assessments to identify the nature and
extent of injuries resulting from the release so that the government can make
claims for natural resource damages against the responsible party. 0
Ultimately, natural resource damage awards are used to fund restoration
projects that will return injured public resources to baseline conditions." l
At its core, then, NRDA is an adversarial process. To be sure, because
natural resource damages awards are used to restore injured public resources,
the science developed to support NRDA claims may not reflexively conjure
concerns of litigation science, at least not in any mass tort sense."
Nonetheless, both government trustees and corporate defendants, like BP
and Exxon, are driven by political and economic, as well as scientific, agendas.
Because of that, scientific studies undertaken during the NRDA process raise
questions of conflicts of interest and bias that are inherent in litigationgenerated science.'1 Indeed, while legal scholars have not examined NRDA
8. Id. at 24.
9. For a primer on natural resource damage assessments and their regulatory context, see
generally ADAM VANN & ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 4 19 72, THE 20o DEEPWATER
HORPZON OIL SPILL: NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT UNDER THE OIL POLLUTION ACT (2013).

lo. Natural resource damages are a special category of congressionally created damages
available for injuries caused from oil spills or hazardous substance releases. See Oil Pollution Act
(OPA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 27o6 (2012); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2012); see also id. § 9607(f) 0).
I1.

33 U.S.C.

§ 2 7 o6(f);

42 U.S.C.

§ 96o7(f)(1).

Classic examples of mass toxic tort litigation include tobacco litigation, asbestos
litigation, Agent Orange litigation, and Bendectin litigation. See, e.g., United States v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2oo6), affd in part, vacated in part, 566 F. 3 d 1095
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam); In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich.
199o); In reAgent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d
187 (2d Cir. 1987). These mass tort litigation cases have been the subject of substantial study. See
generally MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO
POLITICS (3d ed. 2012); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT
LITIGATION (1998); PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS (1986); Michelle J. White, Asbestos and the Future of Mass Torts (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10,3o8, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wlo3o8.
13. For example discussions of conflicts of interest and bias concerns that arise with respect
to adversarial science in the general tort context, see William L. Anderson et al., Daubert's
Backwash: Litigation-GeneratedScience, 34 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 619 (2001); Leslie I. Boden &
David Ozonoff, Litigation-GeneratedScience: Why Should We Care?, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 117
(2oo8); Gary Edmond, Supersizing Daubert Sciencefor Litigation and Its Implicationsfor Legal Practice
12.

and Scientific Research, 52 VILL. L. REV. 857 (2007); Susan Haack, What's Wrong with Litigation-

Driven Science?An Essay in LegalEpistenology, 38 SETON HALLL. REv. 1053 (2oo8); David Michaels
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science as a form of adversarial science, some scientists have outright
questioned the advocacy embedded in NRDA studies.'4
So what can be done when one of the most important sources of science
on the complexity of ecological harms-at least in terms of volume and
opportunity-is also born from litigation? The short answer is: use it. More
specifically, NRDA science should be embraced as an immensely useful source
of understanding ecological harms from both acute and chronic toxic
exposure. But, only after its risks are understood and institutional controls
have been developed to ensure its legitimacy.
Often the science-litigation interface evokes thoughts of Daubert, 'junk
science," and discussions about the competency of courts to fulfill their
gatekeeping role.,5 Indeed, the term "litigation science" made its
jurisprudential debut in Judge Kozinski's Daubert opinion.' 6 Scholars and
courts have since grappled with litigation science and its treatment under
Daubert, some have cast doubt on its veracity as compared to other bodies of
science.'7 By contrast, this Article critiques the discourse that diminishes
scientific knowledge merely because it emerges in a litigation, or adversarial,
context. The real story is much more complicated.
This Article starts with the idea that litigation science plays an important
informational role in understanding long-term ecological injuries. In that
sense, the questions raised here go beyond Daubert,they go beyond the issue
of judging litigation science in the courtroom. The aim is not gatekeeping
experts or sorting junk science from real science in any one case. Rather, the
goal is to optimize the use of adversarial science in informing broader public

& Celeste Monforton, How Litigation Shapes the Scientiflc Literature: Asbestos and Disease Among
Automobile Mechanics, s 5 J.L. & POL'Y 1137 (2007).
14.
See, e.g., John A. Wiens, Applying Ecological Risk Assessment to Environmental Accidents:
Harlequin Ducks and the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 57 BIOSCIENCE 769, 769 (2007) ("When a large

environmental accident occurs, we expect large ecological consequences. When the disruption
is due to human activities, as is the case with an oil spill, we expect the worst. Emotions can

override sound judgment, and litigation can polarize positions and foster advocacy. Hyperbole
replaces hypotheses, and science suffers the consequences.").
15. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, The MisbegottenJudicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27 (2013) (tracing the history of Daubert and considering the role of
judges in distinguishing between various types of science at the evidentiary level).
i6. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3 d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) (asking
"whether the experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of

research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed
their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying").
17.

See, e.g., David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Manufacturing Uncertainty:Contested Science

and the Protection of the Public's Health and Environment, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S39, S43 (2005)
(suggesting that scientific research sponsored by corporations is an affront to public health
because of the purposeful uncertainty that it creates). But cf Samuel L. Tarry, Jr., Can LitigationGeneratedScience PromotePublic Health?,33 AM.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 315 (2009) (arguing that litigation
science funded by corporate defendants has in some cases been instrumental in advancing
understanding of public health concerns).
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health and environmental policy choices well after litigation files have been
closed.
To further the goal of filling the science gap with good science, Part II
examines why adversarial science has an important role to play in
understanding ecological injuries. Part II also surveys the literature and
considers whether adversarial science is different from other forms of policyrelevant science.
After exploring why adversarial science should be permitted or even
encouraged to fill the knowledge gap on toxic exposure, Part III takes a
critical look at NRDA science as a product of advocacy. It uses the scientific
literature in the wake of the Exxon spill to identify three fundamental ways in
which litigation influences NRDA science. Part IV builds on these categories
of influence by examining the particular structural challenges that arise when
assessing long-term harms.
Ultimately, this Article is as much about promise as risk. To that end, Part
V proposes solutions that optimize the ability of NRDA science to advance
scientific understanding of long-term ecological injuries in the wake of
chronic toxic exposure. It examines some ways in which regulatory controls
can be used to harness NRDA science and legitimize it for use beyond the
courtroom. In particular, these solutions encourage the development of longterm scientific study while ensuring that the science is reliable enough to
shape policy and inform understanding outside the particular litigation
context in which it was developed.
By using NRDA science to describe both the benefits and challenges of
adversarial science, this Article shifts the discussion from one of mere
castigation and skepticism to one of optimism. In particular, it opens the door
to future discussions about how courtroom and litigation controls might be
harnessed to enhance the legitimacy of adversarial science outside the
courtroom.
II. THE PROMISE OF ADVERSARIAL SCIENCE
Why is it desirable to encourage reliance on science that is developed in
a litigation context? After all, one natural response to adversarial science
might simply be to write it off as adversarial posturing. However, there are at
least two problems with casting adversarial science aside. First, adversarial
science may be necessary to advance understanding of ecological harms in
under-studied areas like toxic exposure. ,8 Second, adversarial science might

18. Another reason, not examined here, might be the difficulty of separating litigation
science from other forms of scientific inquiry. SeeBoden & Ozonoff, supra note 13, at 120 (noting

why peer review is not necessarily a useful tool for exposing biased science because "peer-reviewed
publication can be manipulated by the parties to litigation" and, in some cases, "factual questions
critical to a legal case may be too narrow to warrant peer-reviewed publication"); William G.
Childs, The OverlappingMagisteria of Law andScience: When Litigation and Science Collide, 85 NEB. L.
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not be inherently biased (or at least not any more so than other forms of
policy-oriented science), but instead, it might simply be perceived as such. If
true, these would both be reasons to embrace adversarial science from NRDA
proceedings.
A.

THE NECES1sTY OFLITIGATION ScIENcE

When it comes to the effects of toxic exposure, there is a significant
science gap on issues of whether toxins cause harm and, if so, in what form.'9
These science gaps have led some scholars to observe that there is a
fundamental failure of regulatory regimes to encourage the systematic study
of toxic exposure.

2

.

The study of long-term toxic exposure presents even more challenges.
Popular media and science literature readily recognize that questions of longterm injuries are inherently complicated because of chronic exposure to
toxins in everyday life.21 In some areas of research, like studies examining

REv. 643, 654 (2007) (critiquing peer review and noting that "peer review in its current form is
a relatively new concept and it is far from infallible").
19. Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failureof EnvironmentalLaw to ProduceNeeded
Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1619 (2004) ("One of the most
significant problems facing environmental law is the dearth of scientific information available to
assess the impact of industrial activities on public health and the environment.").
2o. Id. These information failures are best thought of as regulatory failures because of the
many environmental and public health laws aimed at regulating exposure to toxins and other
pollutants. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, FramingRules: Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 75, 75-79 (2oo8) (detailing the tens of thousands of regulatory mandates embodied
in environmental laws). Consider, for example, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2012) (requiring pesticide manufacturers to obtain
registration from the EPA before marketing new pesticides); Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (2012) (regulating the manufacture of new chemicals); Food Quality
Protection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 34 6a(b)(2) (2012) (requiring the EPA to set tolerance levels for
pesticides on food residue, taking into account aggregate exposure); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321 (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into the waters of the
United States without a permit); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 6922 (2012) (requiring the EPA to promulgate standards for handling and disposing
hazardous waste); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (prohibiting the emission of toxic pollutants
without a permit); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986,
42 U.S.C. § 11002 (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (requiring covered facilities to prepare an emergency
response plan and report their storage, use, and disposal of hazardous substances).
21. See, e.g., James R. Roberts & Catherine J. Karr, Technical Report: Pesticide Exposure in
Children, 130 PEDIATRICS e1765 (2012), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/
content/ 13o/6/e 176 5 .full.pdf+html (noting that although toxicity from pesticides is relatively
uncommon in the United States, subacute and chronic, low-level exposure through foods, dust,
agricultural use, and pet exposures is common and may contribute to a range of diseases and
disabilities); see also Brad Heath & Blake Morrison, EPA Study: 2.2M Live in Areas Where Air Poses
Cancer Risk, USA TODAY, (July 26, 2009, 10:52 PM), http://usatoday3o.usatoday.com/news/
nation/environment/2oo9-o6-23-epa-study_N.htm (discussing the results of the National-Scale
Air Toxics Assessment, or NATA, which is a study used by the EPA to identify parts of the country
where residents could face the greatest health threats from ambient air pollution); Patricia Hunt,
Toxins All Around Us, SCI. AM. (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/

1510

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100: 1503

impacts to marine ecosystems following oil spills, the scientific literature is
starting to recognize that long-term harms can be even more significant than
short-term acute injuries.-2 But, as with long-term injuries to humans from
toxic exposure, time lags, synergistic effects, and complicated biological
interdependencies make it difficult to understand long-term injury to
ecosystems.2 s Tracing causal pathways and differentiating between multiple
contributing stressors is a particularly difficult problem.24 In the toxic torts
area, these challenges have given rise to a rich body of legal literature
discussing the problems of proof and examining alternate causal frameworks
for latent injuries.25
toxins-all-around-us ("Some of the chemicals that are all around us have the ability to interfere
with our endocrine systems, which regulate the hormones that control our weight, our
biorhythms and our reproduction.").
22. See generally Sanne H. Knudsen, The Long-Term Tort:In Search of a New CausationFramework
for Natural Resource Damages, 1o8 Nw. U. L. REV. 475 (2014) (assembling the literature and
examining why long-term ecological harms are more substantial than previously thought).
23.
Id. at 530-31 (discussing the similarities between long-term ecological injury and toxic
tort claims). While in many non-toxic tort cases the effect almost immediately follows the cause,
long latency periods are the primary reason that proving causation is so difficult in toxic tort
cases. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28
cmt. c (solo) ("[T]he causes of some diseases, especially those with significant latency periods,
are generally much less well understood. Even known causes for certain diseases may explain only
a fraction of the incidence of such diseases, with the remainder due to unknown causes."); see also
ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG ET AL., Toxic AND ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 159
(2011) ("With the rise
of toxic torts... proof of causation has become one of the most complex
and controversial aspects of tort liability."); Andrew R.Klein, A ModelforEnhancedRisk Recovery in
Tort, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1173, 1174-75 (1999) (discussing the problems that long latency
periods create in proving causation for toxic torts); Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is
There aRationalSolution to the Problemof Causation?,7 HIGH TECH. LJ.189, 234 (1992) (discussing
the synergistic effects of toxic exposure and raising the example of smoking and asbestos as an
example of complicated questions of causation); Robert L. Rabin, Environmental Liability and the
Tort System, 24 Hous. L.REV. 27, 27-32 (1987) (discussing the distinguishing characteristics of
toxic tort and environmental harm cases).
24. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT AND RESTORATION FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY

(2007), available at http://www.doi.gov/restoration/library/upload/faca-finalreport.pdf
("Quantifying natural resource injury in a manner that supports reliable restoration planning
can be a highly complex technical issue.... Adverse impacts to habitat or organisms at a site may
be caused by a combination of factors--such as development, pesticide use, and soil erosion-in
addition to hazardous substance releases."); Knudsen, supra note 22, at 490-96 (detailing the
factors that make long-term injuries difficult to prove in the natural resource damage context);
see also Mark A. Harwell et al., A Conceptual Model of Natural and Anthropogenic Drivers and Their
Influence on the Prince William Sound, Alaska, Ecosystem, 16 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT
672 (2010) (examining the natural processes, anthropogenic drivers, and resultant stressors that
have affected Prince William Sound following the Exxon Valdez oil spill).
25.
See, e.g.,
Margaret A. Berger, EliminatingGeneral Causation:Notes Towards a New Theory of
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117 (1997); David E. Bernstein, Getting to Causationin
Toxic Tort Cases, 74 BROOK. L.REV. 51 (2oo8); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation,71 MINN. L. REv.
1219 (1987); Donald G. Gifford, The PeculiarChallengesPosed &yLatent Diseases Resultingfrom Mass
Products,64 MD. L. REV. 613 (2005); Steve Gold, Causationin Toxic Torts: Burdensof Proof Standards
of Persuasion,and StatisticalEvidence, 96 YALE LJ. 376 (1986); Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in
11
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As long as the regulatory process creates or tolerates gaps in knowledge,
logic dictates that adversarial science will be developed to offer proof of harm.
The gap in scientific knowledge on issues of toxic exposure, and the potential
of NRDA science to fill those gaps for ecological injuries, makes an active
embrace of litigation science worth considering.26 One area well-known for its
science gap is long-term injury and toxic torts, where causal relationships
between toxic exposure and human or ecological injury are poorly
understood.,7 What are the consequences of chronic and sustained exposure
to benzene in the workplace?s 8 How might chronic use of anti-bacterial soap
by children cause endocrine or hormonal problems later in life?9 What are
the long-term impacts of oil spills on the marine ecosystem?so How are

Toxic Tort Litigation, 14J.L. & POL'Y7 (2oo6); Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability:A Theory
of ProportionalShare Liabilityfor Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151 (2004).
26. See Sheila Jasanoff, Transparency in Public Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits, 68 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 44(2oo6).
27.
See Poulter, supra note 23, at 195 (observing that "[m]uch of the movement toward the
adoption of lenient standards of admissibility and proof of causation in toxic torts has been
prompted by the recognition of the difficulties faced by plaintiffs in meeting the traditional
requirement that they prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their injuries were caused
by chronic, low-level chemical or radiation exposures that were remote in time from the
manifestation of injury"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c (2010); CRAIG ET AL., supra note 23, at 159.
28. For a primer on the health impacts of benzene exposure, see WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
ExPosuRE TO BENZENE: A MAJOR PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERN (n.d.), availableat http://www.who.
int/ipcs/features/benzene.pdf (providing a primer on the health impacts from acute and
chronic exposure to benzene and noting the multiple sources of exposure); see also Steven H.
Lamm et al., Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia and Benzene Exposure: A Systematic Review and MetaAnalysis of the Case-Control Literature, 182 CHEMICo-BIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS 93, 94 (2009)
(reviewing literature linking benzene exposure to a particular subset of leukemia types); A.
Robert Schnatter et al., Review of the Literature on Benzene Exposure and Leukemia Subtypes, 153-54
CHEMIcO-BIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS 9, 12-15 (2005) (reviewing epidemiologic literature on
benzene exposure and leukemia). For examples of benzene litigation and causation issues, see
Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 859, 866 (N.D. Miss. 2005) (finding no
evidence of general causation for Hodgkin's lymphoma because the studies relied upon by the
expert categorized workers broadly and failed to provide specific exposure data); Daniels v.
Lyondell-Citgo Ref. Co., 99 S.W. 3 d 722, 729 (Tex. App. 2003) (finding no evidence of general
causation because the studies relied on by the experts did not show a statistically significant link
between benzene and lung cancer). For examples of plaintiff law firms discussing benzene
litigation and offering free case evaluations, see generally Jelle Vlaanderen et al., Occupational
Benzene Exposure and the Risk of Lymphoma Subtypes: A Meta-Analysis of Cohort Studies Incorporating
Three Study Quality Dimensions, 119 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. 159 (201 1); Benzene and Acute

Lymphocytic Leukemia, METZGER L. GROUP, http://www.toxictorts.com/index.php/toxicchemicals/benzene/benzene-and-acute-lymphocytic-leukemia (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
29.
Safety and Effectiveness of Consumer Antiseptics, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,444 (Dec. 17, 2013)
(proposing to add additional FDA safety restrictions to the use of over-the-counter antibacterial
soap); Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Proposed Rule to Determine Safety and
Effectiveness of Antibacterial Soaps (Dec. 16, 2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/News
Events/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm 3 78 5 4 2.hun.
30.
See Knudsen, supra note 22, at 484-90 (discussing evidence of long-term harm in the
wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill).
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pesticides in groundwater impacting human endocrine systems?3' These are
questions that could benefit most from sustained research, but may never
undergo systematic study as part of any coordinated regulatory regime.
The ad hoc nature of research on harms from chronic chemical or toxic
exposure is at least partially responsible for the gaps in scientific knowledge.
In her work, Professor Wendy Wagner examines the "dearth of research and
basic information" available on how industrial activities affect health and the
environment.32 In doing so, she explains that "[v]irtually every prominent
expert panel convened to consider the effects" have expressed alarm as to the
lack of information.33 This regulatory gap is one reason why litigation science
exists and plays a key role in the development of scientific understanding of
long-term toxic exposure. In fact, litigation and the potential for damage
awards provide the financial incentive to undertake studies to fill in those
gaps.
Wagner's work further suggests that the regulatory gap is not likely to go
away simply because it has been identified. To that end, in suggesting some
theories as to why the regulatory gap exists, Wagner explains that "when the
stakes are high, actors not only will resist producing potentially incriminating
information but [also] will invest in discrediting public research that suggests
their activities are harmful."34 Wagner's observation suggests that litigation
might force the hand of chemical or other product manufacturers who might
otherwise prefer control over access to potentially damaging information.
Litigation and its tools of discovery can serve truth-seeking and informationforcing functions that current regulatory regimes may lack. In fact, Professor
Sheila Jasanoff has recognized the promise of litigation science for testing
knowledge: "[B] ecause litigation itself is such a powerful prod to producing
31.
Wissem Minf et al., Effect of Endocrine DisruptorPesticides: A Review, 8 INT'LJ. ENvTL. REs.
& PuB. HEALTH 2265, 2291 (2011) (recognizing that "the combined actions of pesticides also
need []to be addressed in the risk assessment process because mixtures of these substances may
cause higher toxic effects than those expected from the single compounds" and that "[further
studies are needed on the occurrence, fate and impact of such pesticides on the ecosystem and
public health"); cf Rachel Aviv, A Valuable Reputation, NEW YORKER (Feb. 1o, 2014), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2o 14 /02/1 o/a-valuable-reputation (telling the story of how Dr.
Tyrone Hayes was targeted by Syngenta after uncovering the endocrine-disruptive effects of
atrazine, a widely used herbicide).
32.
See Wagner, supra note 19, at 1625; id.at 1628 ("Even if scientists had a strong
theoretical understanding of how hazardous substances impact health and the environment,
available information is insufficient to apply these theories to assess ecosystem and human
health."); see also Christine H. Kim, Piercingthe Veil of Toxic Ignorance:Judicial Creation of Scientific
Research, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 540, 548 n.44 (2007).
33. SeeWagner, supra note 19, at 1625; see also id. at 1723 (noting that "even the most basic
risks, like acute effects, have been quantified for only a fraction of all chemicals in commerce").
Similar claims regarding the lack of information relating to the public health impacts of everyday
chemicals have been levied in testimony before Congress and in the popular media. See, e.g.,
Everyday Chemicals May Be HarmingKids, Panel Told,CNN (Oct. 26, 2010, 1:21 PM), http://www.
cnn.com/20 i o/HEALTH/i o/26/senate.toxic.america.hearing.
34. SeeWagner, supra note 19, at 1619.
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new scientific evidence, adversarial legal processes sometimes provide the
only significant testing ground for claims relevant to settling disputes."35
NRDA science might be especially valuable for reducing the regulatory
and science gaps. NRDA science has made substantial contributions to
understanding ecological injuries. In the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, for
instance, scientific studies regarding the lingering effects of the oil reveal that
the long-term consequences of toxic exposure might be even more substantial
than the acute, graphic injuries.36 Similarly, the Deepwater Horizon spill
presents unique opportunities for studying the ecosystem response to both
acute and chronic toxic exposure.37 Consider, for example, that researchers
have suddenly found themselves in the middle of an intensive, coordinated,
interdisciplinary and highly visible effort to study deepwater communities in
the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill. This is a resource for which there has
historically been "limited knowledge."38 Now researchers are doing everything
from mapping the location of habitats on the sea floor, to assessing the
potential toxicity for deepwater habitats exposed to oil, to studying impacts
on community composition and reproductive responses.39 For other
resources as well, researchers are busy examining the toxicological responses
of aquatic species in a wide range of habitats, from wetlands to coral.4o
Some NRDA science, like mapping or other resource inventories, can be
undertaken in the absence of an oil spill. After the Deepwater Horizon spill, for
instance, researchers are surveying the sea floor to "confirm the presence of
deepwater coral communities."4' For this work, the oil spill creates a discrete
need, but the research could be done any time there is sufficient desire and
funding.42 Notably, however, the desire to fund this type of inventorying or
purely descriptive science may not exist absent an acute need for information,
as evidenced by the Deepwater Horizon spill itself.
Other NRDA science, however, arises from the unique opportunity to
examine impacts to an entire ecosystem as they unfold in the short and long
term. After an oil spill, the entire affected ecosystem becomes a laboratory. In

35.

Cf Jasanoff, supra note 26, at 39.

36.

See Knudsen, supra note 22, at 485 (discussing studies showing lingering oil and its

effects on the Prince William Sound ecosystem decades after the Exxon spill).
37. For descriptions of the NRDA process underway for the Deepwater Horizon spill, see 2 01 2
DEEPWA TFR HORIZON STATUS REPORT, supra note s, at 15 fig.3; see also BP, NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE GULF OF MEXICO DEEPWATER HORIZON AccIDENT: ASSESSING,
LEARNING, SHARING (2012) [hereinafter BP NRDA REPORT], available at http://www.thestateof

thegulf.com/media/1 25 7/Green-bookyear_2_reportfinal.pdf.
38.
2012 DEEPWATER HORIZONSTATUS REPORT, supra note i, at 31.

39.
40.
41.

Id.at 31-33.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 34 42.
See infra Part V.A for suggestions on how to encourage more coordinated research
before disaster events; see also Usha Varanasi, Frontloading the Science in Anticipation of
Environmental Disasters,37 FISHERIES 233, 234 (2ol 2).
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this way, NRDA science provides a rare chance to study first-hand the
resilience of marine ecosystems and to sort out the synergistic implications of
multiple stressors that otherwise combine to affect change.43 Moreover, the
NRDA scientific programs are extensive and have the potential for systematic,
coordinated, and multi-disciplinary studies of a single marine ecosystem.44
Sometimes, the studies are undertaken over many decades and provide
significant insight into the nature of long-term harms.45 In these ways, NRDA
science will necessarily make a substantial contribution to the collective
scientific understanding of toxic exposure and marine ecosystems.4 6 Indeed,
the catastrophic nature of oil spills, public outcry, and inherently reactive
nature of NRDA combine to create opportunities for scientific study that
cannot be fully replicated outside of the crisis setting. The natural resource
damage context is therefore one area where litigation science plays an
information role that cannot simply be filled by regulatory regimes.
In the end, the value added from the NRDA process amounts to more
than just arriving at a dollar figure for damages. In fact, it is destructive to
think that the vast amount of science NRDA generates can be discarded
simply because it emerges from an adversarial context. Doing so would
undermine the broader public interest in understanding ecological effects
from acute and chronic toxic exposure. A better approach is to assess how
NRDA science is influenced by its adversarial context and propose solutions
to legitimize the science or the perception of the science. This approach
serves the dual goals of advancing the state of knowledge and ensuring the
integrity of that knowledge.
B. COMPARING ADVERSARJAL SCIENCE TO OTHER POLICY-RELEVANT SCIENCE
Just because adversarial science fills an information gap does not alone
mean it should be embraced. Indeed, for information to be useful, it must
also be reliable. To that end, we ought to pause for a moment to consider
43.

In a report to the President, the National Oil Spill Commission lamented the lack of

funding immediately following the DeepwaterHorizon oil spill because of the unique opportunity
presented by the spill to study deep ocean responses to oil spills. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP
DFEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND

[hereinafter NATIONAL OIL SPILL COMMISSION
REPORT] ("But funding for academic and other scientists in the days and weeks immediately after
the spill was limited. As a result, the nation lost a fleeting opportunity to maximize scientific
understanding of how oil spills-particularly in the deep ocean-adversely affect individual
THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 184 (2011)

organisms and the marine ecosystem." (citation omitted)).
44. See, e.g., 2012 DEEPWATER HORIZON STATUS REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 fig.3 (showing

the numerous NRDA Technical Working Groups that have been assembled to evaluate the
impacts of the BP Gulf Oil Spill).

45.

Id. at

24

("Trustees remain committed to a long-term assessment of the Gulf, recognizing

that the Deepwater Horizonoil spill will affect the region's natural resources for years to come.").
46. See BP NRDA REPORT, supra note 37, at 3 ("We know more about environmental
conditions in the Gulf today because some of the best experts in the U.S. and the world have
focused their attention and research on these resources.").
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whether science born out of litigation is inherently more suspect than other
forms of policy-relevant science. If we find the veracity of adversarial science
particularly suspect, we might prefer to explore other mechanisms for
generating the necessary information.
Importantly, many scholars have deeply considered the complicated
intersections of policy and science.47 In doing so, they have grappled with the
legitimacy concerns that arise when science is used to advance a particular
public policy or regulatory agenda, albeit outside the litigation context.4
They have questioned whether science can in fact be separated from the
policy judgments that are inextricably intertwined with risk management
decisions.49 They have examined uncertainty inherent in science, paying
special attention to efforts by some stakeholders to use or manufacture
uncertainty as a means of avoiding regulation.5o

47. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Which Science? Whose Science? How Scientific Disciplines Can Shape
Environmental Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 476 (2012) (examining how understanding the
perspectives of various scientific disciplines might be useful in legal institutional design); Holly
Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 16o 1, 1652-53
(2oo8) (exploring complications at the science and policy interface and arguing that "[b]oth
scientific and political integrity are essential to effective and legitimate environmental policy");
Sheila S.Jasanoff, ContestedBoundariesin Policy-Relevant Science, 17 SOC.STUD. SCI. 195, 195 (1987)
(explaining that the "deconstruction" and "reconstruction" of science during the regulatory
decision-making process puts "unusual strains on science"); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade
in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995) (examining how "agencies
exaggerate the contributions made by science in setting toxic standards in order to avoid
accountability for the underlying policy decisions"). See generally Oliver Houck, Tales from a
Troubled Marriage:Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 302 SCIENCE 1926 (2003) (describing
the roles that science has played in setting environmental policy).
48. See, e.g., Angus Macbeth & Gary Marchant, Improving the Government's Environmental
Science, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 134 (2oo8) (examining the many ways that science plays a role in
shaping environmental regulation and suggesting methods for insulating scientific results from
political influence).
49. See Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifling Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk
Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1257-58 (2004) ("But even though science is valuable for
what it can tell administrators about policy problems and their possible solutions, science alone
cannot provide a complete rationale for a policy decision because it does not address the
normative aspects of administrative policymaking.").
5o. HollyDoremus, Precaution,Science, andLearningWhileDoing in NaturalResource Management,
82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 548 (2007) (remarking that "[u]ncertainty is the unifying hallmark of
environmental and natural resource regulation"); Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural
Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 258 (2005) [hereinafter
Doremus, Science Plays Defense] ("The combination of actual uncertainty and public expectations of
certainty makes the rhetoric of science equally available to the regulatory offense and defense.");
Michaels & Monforton, supra note 17; David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Scientfic Evidence in the
Regulatory System: Manufacturing Uncertainty and the Demise of the Formal Regulatory System. 13 J.L. &
POL'Y 17, 31-38 (2005) (describing and providing examples of "real" and "manufactured"
uncertainty in science and how those uncertainties impact the regulatory process).
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Even when popular audiences, scientists, and politicians have called for
the revival of "sound science" in regulatory decision-making,5' scholars have
questioned whether any science that is used in setting public policy can really
be deemed "pure science."52 Indeed, well-known scholars like Professor Sheila
Jasanoff have long argued that even the act of labeling science as "pure
science" or "policy-relevant science" is a contested exercise shaped by
institutional and political interests.53
In the area of natural resources law, Professor Holly Doremus has
described the related phenomena where agencies make policy decisions in
the name of science in order to avoid scrutiny.54 She explains that " [t] he core
of the problem is not the involvement of politics but its concealment behind
a cloak of science."55 Professor Wendy Wagner has made similar observations
in the toxic regulation context, unveiling a "science charade" where "agencies
exaggerate the contributions made by science in setting toxic standards in
order to avoid accountability for the underlying policy decisions."56 These
observations are consistent withJasanoff's assertion that labels matter in terms
of public perception; for Doremus and Wagner, the desire to label policy
decisions as scientific ones motivates agencies to shape their rationales
around science.57 This phenomenon has lead Doremus to call for greater

See Lewis M. Branscomb, Science, Politics, and U.S. Democracy, 21 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 1, 53
(cautioning "that if either scientists or politicians so politicize their mutual engagement
that they sacrifice the credibility of the scientists and the legitimacy of the government officials,
the consequences to the nation's time-honored system of governance could be serious indeed");
Robert T. Lackey, Science, Scientists, and Policy Advocacy, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 12, 12 (2007)
(cautioning other scientists against crossing the line from "participat[ing] in public policy
deliberations" to "advocating for their policy preferences"); Jake C. Rice, Food for Thought:
Advocacy Science and Fisheries Decision-Making, 68 ICESJ. MARINE SCI. 10, 13-16 (20 1) (urging
other scientists to choose alternative ways of participating in policy debates without tainting the
51

(2004)

respected position of science); Daniel Sarewitz, The Rightful Placeof Science, 25 ISSUES SCI. & TECH.

4, 89 (2009) (critiquing and providing context to President Obama's call to "restore science to
its rightful place").
52.
SeeJasanoff, supra note 47, at 200 (remarking that "[f]or science in the policy context,
the age of innocence ended in the early 197os" when a surge of environmental statutory schemes
placed substantial pressure on science to predict and prevent future environmental harm).
53. Id. at 224 (stating that "scientists, private interest groups and members of the policy
establishment all have a stake in the definition of science and non-science, and the vocabulary
used by all of these parties remains subject to manipulation").
54. Doremus, Science Plays Defense, supra note 5o, at 254 (explaining that "the political
appeal of science has long encouraged overemphasis of the role of science in regulatory choices.
Both regulators and their critics are tempted to scientize regulatory decisions, falsely claiming
that science is or should be the determinative factor").
55. Id. at 253.
56. See Wagner, supra note 47, at 1617.
57. Doremus, Science Plays Defense, supra note 5o,at 255-56 (describing why agencies are
motivated to hide behind the specter of science when making what are at heart policy choices).
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transparency in regulatory decisions in order to make clear when science
stops and policy starts.58
Many solutions have been proposed, including increasing transparency
in regulatory decisions,so allowing access to federally funded research data, 6o
instituting greater regulatory peer review, 6' reexamining the reliance on
scientific advisory committees, 6 and imposing Daubert-like review on agency
decisions.6 3
In some ways, the challenges of litigation science are similar to science
generated in the regulatory context. In neither context is the science "pure."64
The science is undertaken with a particular purpose in mind, whether that
purpose is setting policy at a regulatory level or providing evidence of injury. 65
There may also be a propensity to generate uncertainty as a way of
manipulating the outcome. 66 In the regulatory sphere, scientific uncertainty
is one tool for combatting additional regulatory oversight. 67 In the litigation

58.
Id. at 299 ("[I]n the regulatory context, transparency means revealing scientific
judgments, so that they can be subjected to scientific evaluation, and also revealing political
judgments so that they can be evaluated through the political process."); Doremus, supra note
47, at 1639-49 (suggesting ways of bringing more integrity and transparency to regulatory
decisions).
59- Doremus, supra note 47, at 1646-48 (suggesting several ways to increase the political
integrity of "science-laden policy decisions" by increasing the transparency); Jasanoff, supra note
26, at 21-35 (examining the benefits and perils of increased transparency).
6o. See generally Richard Shelby, Accountability and Transparency: Public Access to Federally
FundedResearch Data,37 HARV.J. ON LEGIs. 369 (2ooo) (discussing proposals in Congress to allow
greater access to research data obtained with federal funds).
61. See generallyJ.B. Ruhl &James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatoy Peer Review, 84 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1 (2oo6); Ian Fein, Comment, Reassessing the Role of the National Research Council: Peer
Review, PoliticalTool, or Science Court?, 99 CALIF.L. REv. 465 (2011) (exploring the use of the NRC
committees as a means of institutionalizing regulatory peer review).
62. See generally Gregory N. Mandel & Gary E. Marchant, The Living Regulatory Challenges of
Synthetic Biology, too IOWA L. REV. 155 (2014) (discussing several ways to legitimize synthetic
biology regulation, including scientific advisory boards and private-public partnerships);
Stephanie Tai, ComparingApproaches Towards GoverningScientific Advisory Bodies on Food Safety in the
United States and the European Union, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 627 (exploring how the use of scientific
advisory committees can help legitimize food safety regulation).
63. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, On the Prospect of "Daubertizing"Judicial
Review of Risk
Assessment, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155 (2003). For further information, see Doremus, Science
Plays Defense, supra note 5o, at 291-92 (discussing the literature on imposing Daubertstandards to
agency decisions).
64. SeeJasanoff, supra note 47, at 200.
65. Thomas McGarity and Wendy Wagner present various case studies that demonstrate
ways in which science has been manipulated, including examples of manipulation in both the
regulatory context and in litigation. See, e.g.,
THOMAS 0. McGARIY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING
SCIENCE: How SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRuPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 68 (2008) (noting that
"[b]iased designs are also evident in some research prepared for litigation").
66. See supra note 5o (compiling scholarly literature discussing scientific uncertainty and
incentives to generate uncertainty for a tactical advantage in policy-making).
67. See Doremus, Science Plays Defense, supra note 5o, at 254-56; Wagner, supra note 47, at
1687 (explaining that there is little incentive for private research to fill scientific information
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context, defendants have a particular incentive to generate uncertainty as a
way of undermining the plaintiffs' ability to meet their burden of proof on
issues like causation. 68 And finally, in both contexts, funding imbalances may
affect the ability of certain stakeholders to generate more or high levels of
science to advance their positions.6 9 Regardless of whether empirical data
would bear out those claims, there may at least be a perception that
corporations have greater funding available to generate science to advance
their desired outcomes. Those perceptions may matter.70
For all these reasons, science produced in the anticipation of litigation
does not raise entirely unique concerns. Many influential scholars have
observed the competing influences and agendas that shape policy-relevant
science. Some of those observations apply to adversarial science as well. And
yet, science produced in the adversarial context ought at least be examined
on its own terms. To be sure, despite the general similarities between
adversarial science and other forms of policy-relevant science, there are also
differences. These differences are largely driven by the culture of litigation as
an acceptable forum to battle with a narrow purpose-winning for individual
gain. Plaintiffs who are able to prove injury through the help of science stand
to gain greater monetary awards. Defendants, too, have immediate financial
incentives.71 Litigation is typically a private enterprise, with clear winners and
losers, and set in a reactive frame where, ultimately, liability will be judged
and damages awarded. By the very nature of its focused and reactive frame,
litigation is less searching and less concerned with community outcomes. The
parties are expected to advance their best positions and attempt to rebut

gaps given that "[t]he agencies' science-bias in prioritizing substances for regulation virtually
guarantees that greater regulation will ultimately follow advancements in scientific information
and knowledge").
68. See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEx. L. REv.
1, 41 (1995) ("[P]lacing the burden of proof on the plaintiff creates a perverse incentive for
actors to foster strong uncertainty about general causation.").
69. See Sheldon Krimsky, The FundingEffect in Science and Its Implicationsfor the Judiciary, 13
J.L. & POLY 43, 61-62 (2005) (discussing the influence of funding on science and noting that
"there is no evidence that pre-litigation research is more dependable or objective than postlitigation research"); see also MCGARITY &WAGNER, supranote 65, at 96 (suggesting that privatelyfunded research "too often dominates the highly contested and poorly supervised arena of policyrelevant science"); Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 13, at i19 (asserting that "[w]ell-financed
industries have the resources to seed the literature with strategic science" and that by comparison,
few plaintiffs have the means to do so).
70.
See Macbeth & Marchant, supra note 48, at 148 (differentiating "sound science" from
"trusted science" and discussing the importance of basing regulatory decisions on science that is
perceived as credible).
71. See Douglas G. Smith, Resolution ofMass Tort Claims in the BankruptcySystem, 41 U.C. DAVIs
L. REV. 1613, 1622 (2008) ("Beginning in the i98os, companies that manufactured asbestoscontaining materials such as Johns-Manville and Raybestos were forced into Chapter i 1
bankruptcy after being deluged with waves of asbestos-related claims.").
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contradictory evidence.72 The parties are not expected to objectively examine
the evidence and present a measured view of their case.
By contrast, regulatory science is generated to advance a public policy or
public health objective. Notwithstanding differing opinions on what public
policy decision might be preferable, and notwithstanding the self-interest that
nonetheless drives some decisions (e.g., getting a new drug approved by the
FDA), the regulatory conversation is framed from the perspective of
advancing a public purpose.
In the end, these differences may do more to shape perception than
anything else. In fact, there are reasons to think that adversarial science,
though different in some respects, might not be vastly more prone to
manipulation than other forms of policy-relevant science.73 After all,
adversarial science is subject to controls that are not part of the regulatory
process. For example, experts advancing adversarial science are subject to
cross-examination and evidentiary rules.74 Science developed outside the
litigation context provides no guarantee of purity or lack of bias.75 If that is
true, adversarial science may not be worth dismissing out of hand. In other
words, if litigation science is not uniquely plagued by self-interest, it cannot
fairly be dismissed on that basis unless all policy-oriented science undergoes
similar castigation.

72.
See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 32 (observing that "attorneys seeking expert witnesses"
have no incentive to uncover the truth, but to choose witnesses who advance their position); id.
at 32 n.34 (assembling literature providing similar observations about a litigant's incentives to
skew the selection of science or experts presented during litigation).
73. For additional discussion of whether litigation-science is more inherently biased than
other forms of policy-relevant science, see Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 13, at 117 (arguing that
litigation-generated science should not be treated differently); see also Haack, supra note 13, at
1077 (arguing that litigation-generated science is "likely to be biased") ;Janet Raloff ,JudgingScience:
CourtsMay Be Too Skeptical of ResearchDone with Juriesin Mind, 173 ScI. NEWS 42 (2008). See generally
Edmond, supra note 13 (reviewing and challenging the perception of "science for litigation").
74. See Boden & Ozonoff, supranote 13, at 12o ("Few, if any, journal peer-review processes
are as stringent or as probing as the usual cross-examination performed in an adversarial
setting."); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) ("Expert
evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.
Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule
403 of the present rules exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses." (quoting
Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138
F.R.D. 63 1,6 3 2 (1991))).
75. See, e.g., Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 13, at 118 (noting that "[a] growing body of
scholarship has consistently raised concerns about bias generated by conflicts of interest outside
of [litigation-generated science]"); Mark R. Patterson, Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Expert
Testimony, 40 WM. & MARY L. RFV. 1313, 1322 (1999) ("Even when such research is conducted
independent of 'litigation,' it is not necessarily conducted free of conflicts of interest."); Wendy
Wagner & David Michaels, Equal TreatmentforRegulatoiy Science: Extendingthe Controls Governingthe
Quality of PublicResearch to Private Research, 3 o AM.J.L. & MED. 119, 122 (2004) (explaining that
for certain kinds of policy-relevant research, funders "face strong incentives to design and report
research in ways most favorable to their interests and to suppress adverse results provided they
can do so without detection").
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This claim may be especially true for NRDA science, which is a bit of a
hybrid between what is typically thought of as litigation science and regulatory
science. Natural resource damage trustees are driven by a mandate to restore
injured public resources and charged by regulation to act "on behalf of the
public."76 Indeed, natural resource damage awards are earmarked for
restoration and do not get folded into the coffers of any agency budget.77 The
private emphasis of NRDA litigation, therefore, may be less pronounced than
classic product liability cases.
Of course, the ability of adversarial science to play a useful role in public
policy will turn on perceptions as much as empirics. To that end, litigation
science has carried the stigma of bias since the term was first introduced by
Judge Kozinski in the Daubertlitigation.7S This perception of bias, whether or
not there is actual bias, could prevent litigation science from serving the
useful function of informing public policy decisions or shaping broader
scientific conversations.79 At a minimum, examining adversarial science on its
own terms and shaping institutional controls to address identified risks might
go a long way towards lessening the perceived or actual bias. In doing so, the
science can more readily fulfill its promise as an informational asset to the
broader scientific community.
Up until now, little work has been done in this area. Outside the Daubert
context, few scholars have considered the implications of litigation science for
science writ large.s ° Certainly in the area of environmental and natural

o
76. See 15 C.F.R. § 99 .11 (2014) (providing the OPA regulations governing NRDA).
77. See 4 2 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) (2012) ("Sums recovered by the United States Government
as trustee under this subsection shall be retained by the trustee, without further appropriation,
for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources.").
78. SeeDaubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F. 3 d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
79. See, e.g., Childs, supra note 18, at 668 (quoting Anderson et al., supra note 13, at 624
[
(noting that " t] he reliability and accuracy of litigation-based research is likely to be viewed with
suspicion because of the potential bias arising from the source of funding for the research and
the relationship between the researchers and the lawyers")).
8o. For examples of detailed consideration of science used in the litigation context, see
Sheila Jasanoff, Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the Legal Process, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 328,
329 (2oo6) ("This article examines points in the transition from scientific observation to
proffered legal evidence at which problems may creep into the production of science for legal
uses."); see also Childs, supranote 18, at 646 (discussing Daubert's spillover effects into the peerreview process and influence on litigation-generated science and concluding "that it is far from
self-evident that the 'contamination' of science by law (e.g., lawyers meddling in peer review) or
of law by science (e.g., litigation-driven scholarship showing up in litigation) necessarily weakens
either science or law"). For discussion not of litigation-science, but of how science is used in the
courtroom, see Sheila Jasanoff, Representation and Re-Presentationin Litigation Science, 116 ENVrL.
HEALTH PERSP. 123, 129 (2oo8) ("By looking at science as a form of persuasive representation,
and by importing the ideas of impartiality and symmetry from the sociology of scientific
knowledge, we can radically reconceptualize the judicial role in relation to scientific evidence:
from gatekeeping to refereeing."). For an example of scholarship discussing Daubert issues with
respect to natural resources and environmental issues, see Susan R. Poulter, Science and PseudoScience: Will Daubert Make a Difference?, 40 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7-1 (1994). For an example
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resource regulation, the litigation science literature is devoid of the rich
treatment and analysis that other forms of policy-relevant science have
enjoyed.8 ' Occasionally, in the context of their broader work on science and
the law, some scholars have uncovered case studies relevant to litigationgenerated science.8 2 Very few commenters, however, have focused outwardly
on whether adversarial science poses a threat to scientific understanding writ
large.8S This Article takes up that task and does so in the NRDA context. In
doing so, this Article brings issues of litigation-generated science into the
broader science and law dialogue and considers how litigation influences
science beyond the courtroom.8 4
III. DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEMS OF NRDA SCIENCE

If we agree that adversarial science can fill an information need, and if
we agree that adversarial science may not be any more susceptible to bias than
other forms of policy-relevant science, we might begin to see why adversarial
science should not be reflexively cast aside. But the degree to which
adversarial science will and should be actively embraced-and can serve a
of literature discussing junk science, see Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing 'junk Science,"
1998 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 3.
81.
One student-written Note raises the litigation-science issue in the context of complex
environmental torts. Keum J. Park, Note, judicial Utilization of Scientific Evidence in Complex
Environmental Torts: Redefining Litigation Driven Research, 7 FORDHAM ENvrL. L. REv. 483, 487
(1996). Another student-written Note, in discussing how Kepone and the Exxon Valdez oil spill
have changed NRDA regulations and valuation methods, raises the issue of litigation-science postExxon. Danielle Marie Stager, Note, From Kepone to Exxon Valdez Oil and Beyond: An Overiew of
Natural ResourceDamage Assessment, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 751, 753 (1995).
82. See generally Michaels & Monforton, supranote 50 (discussing popcorn lung disease and
considering the impacts of both litigation and regulation on OHSA's response to workplace
hazards) ;James M. Wood & Roxanne M. Gariby, HoardingAway Science: Towards a More Transparent
View of Health and Online Registriesfor Independent PostmarketDrug Research, 6 FOOD & DRUG LJ.
547 (2005) (focusing primarily on the need for greater transparency with post-market drug
research and the use of the Internet, but giving some examples of litigation-generated science
that was rejected by courts).
83. SeeAnderson et al., supra note 13, at 622 (observing that "[1] itigation-driven science may
ultimately provide a useful contribution to the scientific literature, but not until there are
processes in place to ensure its scientific reliability"); Michaels & Monforton, supra note 13, at
1165 (using an asbestos case study to show how parties involved in toxic tort litigation "seed the
scientific literature" and therefore, generate external consequences for public health); see also
Tarry, supra note 17, at 316 (arguing that, in a practitioner-oriented work, "scientific research
sponsored by corporations defending civil lawsuits can, in fact, not only assist in the adjudication
of civil disputes, but also advance scientific understanding and help improve health outcomes
across populations").
84. Professor Stephanie Tai has considered how future scientific funding is shaped by
litigation, but not whether the science generated through environmental litigation is itself
influencing the broader understanding of ecological harms. See generally Stephanie Tai, Science
Policy Through the Lens of U.S. Domestic Climate Change Litigation, 27 WIS. INT'L L.J. 462 (2010)
(examining how climate change litigation is shaping regulatory research agendas and affecting
decisions to fund future scientific research, but not discussing whether science generated during
litigation is impacting the broader understanding of climate change).
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greater informational role in the scientific community-requires a more
detailed understanding of how adversarial contexts actually shape science. In
other words, what are the ramifications of generating science within an
adversarial frame? In particular, what are the risks of letting litigation shape
the scientific study of harm from oil spills? Are there signs that the science is
influenced by the incentives of the parties to litigation? Does the
government's role as trustee for natural resources temper the typical private
and narrow-minded focus of litigation?
This Part begins by examining how the adversarial nature of NRDA
shapes science agendas and science. In doing so, it identifies three basic
categories of influence. First, NRDA science is influenced by the conflicting
goals of lawyers and scientists. In many ways, science becomes subservient to
litigation. Second, when government-generated science and privately
generated science are held to different standards of transparency, problems
of parity and asymmetrical science emerge. Finally, as with other forms of
policy-relevant science, NRDA provides an overt incentive to generate
uncertainty in the science. By unpacking the influences of litigation on NRDA
science, this Part sets the foundation for assessing potential solutions.
A.

LITIGATION SCIENCE AS SUBSERVIENT SCIENCE

Setting the seedy underbelly of litigation aside for the moment, NRDA's
adversarial context influences science in a couple of practical ways. To start,
litigation and lawyers may simply distract scientists from their science. At its
core, science is an exercise of exploration and discovery. Scientific discovery
takes time to unfold and is an iterative process of learning through
experimentation.5 Litigation, on the other hand, is a time-pressured and
calculated exercise in separating relevant from irrelevant information, where
relevance and importance is largely determined by what can be proved and
valued for the purpose of eliciting a remedy.86 These differences in law and
science, in combination with the limited resources with which trustees must
initially assess natural resource damages, create tensions between two
agendas-those driven by science and those driven by litigation posturing.
Notably, these tensions arise even though NRDA has a more public focus than
traditional tort litigation.

85.
See David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
37, 52 ( 3 d ed. 2011) (explaining that law and justice require decisions to be made within a
reasonable amount of time but that science is under no such time pressure).
86.
Id. ("[S] cience and the law differ fundamentally in their objectives. The objective of the
law is justice; that of science is truth."); Jasanoff, supra note 47, at 197 ("Both science and
regulation seek to establish facts. But the adversarial processes of rule-making employed in the
United States presume that 'truth' emerges from an open and ritualized clash of conflicting
opinions rather than from the delicate and informal negotiations that characterize fact-finding
in science.").
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Take the NRDA process in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill as an
example. In recounting that processJoe Hunt described the tension between
scientists and lawyers:
[L]awyers were seen as calling the shots based on legal strategies
rather than biological need. At least, that's the way many scientists
perceived it. . . . Attorneys and researchers-minds of different
disciplines and objectives-struggled to speak the same language
and often broke down in frustration and anger. Researchers felt it
was inappropriate for attorneys to be shaping the scientific approach
to assessing damage. The legal team felt it was their role to adhere
to the law while obtaining the best possible results for their litigation
against Exxon. 87
Hunt, a former communications director of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
Trustee Council, further emphasized that while the quality of the science did
not suffer, the legal process did "dictate what would be studied."88 NRDA
regulations governing the pre-assessment process require trustees to
undertake a cost-benefit analysis to "ensure that there is a reasonable
probability of making a successful claim before monies and efforts are
expended in carrying out an assessment."89
Contingent valuation studies provide a poignant example of how
evaluating injuries is driven as much by litigation strategy as it is by the desire
for scientific understanding.o By way of background, contingent valuation is
a method for evaluating the nonuse or passive use loss suffered by society
when public resources are injured.9' Though controversial, the method for
valuing passive use loss for NRDA has been upheld by courts.92 After the Exxon

87.

JOE HUNT, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TR. COUNCIL, MISSION WITHOUT A MAP: THE POLITICS

AND POLICIES OF RESTORATION FOLLOWING THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 57-58 (n.d.), available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ocs/mafac/meetings/ 201 o.o6/docs/mission withoutmapevos.pdf.
88.

Id. at 58.

89.
43 C.F.R. § 11.23 (2014) (requiring a pre-assessment screen for ensuring that the
NRDA process will bear fruit).
go.
For a detailed account of the development and use of the contingent valuation study in
the Exxon spill, see HUNT, supra note 87, at 6o-6i; see also Richard T. Carson et al., Contingent
Valuation and Lost Passive Use: Damagesfrom the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 25 ENVrL. & RESOURCE
ECON. 257, 258 (2003).
gi.
See Carson et al., supra note go, at 258 ("Contingent valuation is a survey approach
designed to create the missing market for public goods by determining what people would be
willing to pay (WTP) for specified changes in the quantity or quality of such goods or, more
rarely, what they would be willing to accept (WTA) in compensation for well-specified
degradations in the provision of these goods.").
92.
Kennecott Utah Copper Co. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 88 F. 3 d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(leaving DOI regulations on contingent valuation undisturbed); Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the
Interior, 88o F.2d 432, 474-81 (D.C. Cir. ig8g) (upholding portions of DOI regulations that
permitted the use of contingent valuation); Natural Resources Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg.
1o62, 1182-83 (Jan. 7, 1994) (to be codified at t 5 C.F.R. § 99o.78(b) (5)) (codifying post-Exxon
regulations under OPA that validate contingent valuation as an appropriate method for

1524

IOWA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 100: 150 3

spill, when the use of this method was still hotly contested, trustees spent $3
million dollars on a contingent valuation household survey to determine what
the average American household would be willing to pay to prevent another
Exxon-like disaster.93 Early reports rumored the results were somewhere
between $3 billion and $8 billion.94 The Los Angeles Times reported a figure
of $i o billion.95
For lawyers, contingent valuation generates settlement leverage,
especially where-as in Exxon-the results are suspected to return a large
damage figure. From that perspective, contingent valuation studies are worth
the price tag. From the perspective of science, however, contingent valuation
has little to do with the assessment of harm to the ecosystem. Contingent
valuation aides lawyers in leveraging a sizeable settlement from defendants,
but it does not advance the understanding of harm to the ecosystem in any
scientific sense.
Litigation agendas also affect choices of what to focus on among two
equally valid scientific projects. Some commenters have posited that the
relative worth of sea otters and sea stars may have influenced the decision to
study one and not the other. For example, oiled sea otters, popular and
charismatic mammals, are valued at $81,ooo each (based on the cost of
cleaning and rehabilitating them).96 By contrast, oiled sea stars are "worth
barely a buck and a quarter"97 and were not studied as part of the NRDA
process after Exxon. David Irons, an expert on seabirds with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, once remarked that "[s]ea stars might be driving the entire
ecosystem.... But we would never know that because we weren't able to study
8
it. It wouldn't pay for itself in court."9
To be sure, the idea that not all worthy scientific inquiries can be funded
and that hard choices have to be made is not unique to the litigation context.
Scientists often compete for limited funding.99 But funding-driven tradeoffs
measuring passive use values); see alsoJeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental
Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages,43 DUKE L.J. 879 (1994) (examining
contingent valuation methods and arguing for the measurement and compensation of
nonpecuniary losses).
93. HUNT, supra note 87, at 6o.
94. Id. (noting that the original estimates were in the range of $2.8 million and $8 million).
95- Id.
96. Id. at 55.
97. Id.
98. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. See ROBERT GOLDBORT, WRITING FOR SCIENCE 271 (2006) ("Government agenciesincluding the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the US Department
of Agriculture, and NASA-collectively grant billions of dollars annually for scientific research,
but the statistical truth is that many more proposals are submitted than can possibly be funded.").
Trustees are often constrained by funding when working through the NRDA process. See, e.g.,
Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA: Failures, Lessons Learned, and
Alternatives, 38 N.M. L. REv. 409, 447-48 (2oo8) ("Natural resource trustees are generally
understaffed and under-funded."). For a discussion of the financial risks posed to the federal
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in the NRDA context go beyond garden-variety funding decisions, where
research dollars are allocated by weighing the relative scientific strength of
the proposed projects.oo
These litigation-driven tradeoffs may result in lost opportunities to better
understand the long-term harms of toxic exposure. In other words, some
harm will go undetected simply because it was never studied.' °' Again, sea
stars are one example. Similarly, other important forage fish, like the sand
lance, were not studied at all, leaving some scientists to lament missed
opportunities: "One of the biggest missed opportunities in NRDA was not
looking at sand lance."102 The study of sand lance is now thought to have been
particularly informative given that these fish burrow daily in the sands of
intertidal regions where most of the oil was later found to have
accumulated.03 In this way, research choices made during the NRDA process
directly impact downstream understanding of long-term harm. By
recognizing that, we might begin to consider how the NRDA process can be
harnessed to fill knowledge gaps, rather than perpetuate them.
When science is subservient, litigation not only influences what science
to fund, but it can also inadvertently influence the quality of science. For
example, while assessing injuries in the wake of the Exxon spill, trustee
scientists were under a gag order to keep Exxon from gaining insight to the

government for oil spills like the BP Gulf Oil Spill and how funding mechanisms work, see
generally U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-86, DEEPwATER HOPIZON OIL SPILL:
ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE EVOLVING BUT UNCERTAIN FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISKS (201 1),

available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/59o/585875.pdf; see also HUNT, supra note 87, at 20
(reporting that after the Alaska legislature appropriated $35 million, $20 million was reserved
for litigation, while the rest was left for NRDA studies and oil spill response efforts); Sanne H.
Knudsen, Remedying the Misuse of Nature, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 141, 192-93 (discussing the funding
problems faced by government trustees and assembling the literature).
loo.
See, e.g.,
42 C.F.R. § 5 2h.8 (2014) (setting merit-based criteria for evaluating proposed
research grants). Consider also that the National Institute of Health evaluates all research
proposals through a two-tier peer-review process, mandated by regulation and intended to
allocate funding without bias. SeeNAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PEER REVIEW: GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS 3 (2° 14), available at http://grants.nih.

gov/grants/PeerReview227 13webv2.pdf ("The two levels of NIH peer review help ensure that
the assessment of scientific and technical merit is separate from the funding decision.").
lo.
Even when resources are studied, the drive to recover damages might overshadow
research more seriously focused on understanding ecosystem function and harm. For example,
initial studies of Pacific herring after the Exxon spill focused on the economic losses to the
commercial fishing industry, as opposed to the importance of herring to the food chain. See
HUNT, supra note 87, at 55.
102.
Id. (citation omitted).
1o3.
Id. For general discussion of the sand lance and its potential importance and links to
the marine ecosystem, see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SAND LANCE: A REVIEW OF BIOLOGY AND
PREDATOR RELATIONS AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 24 (Martin D. Robards et al. eds., 1999),

availableat http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/rP- 5 2 ia.pdf ("Links between decreased abundance
of suitable forage fish and marine predators' reproductive success or population size have been
suggested or reported from many regions of the world .. ").
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trustees' settlement strategy. 0 4 This gag order impeded collaboration
between scientists and hampered efforts to build on evolving knowledge.o5
Though the gag orders did not direct the outcome of science in any nefarious
sense, it is an example of how litigation's dominant role in NRDA can
undermine the ability of scientists to assess the injuries caused by the spill.
Notably, some of the failures of communication between scientists that
plagued early NRDA efforts after Exxon have not been as prominent in the
wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Deepwater Trustees have placed
deliberate emphasis on coordinating across resource disciplines and
implementing effective information management strategies., °6 In addition,
those trustees were able to negotiate for an early restoration fund that would
help alleviate some of the funding issues facing trustees following the Exxon
spill. 107 With additional funding options, the science agenda in the case of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill could face fewer monetary constraints, and compete
less overtly with litigation strategies.
And yet, criticisms of litigation's influence on science in the wake of the
DeepwaterHorizondisaster are already emerging. For example, the Chair of the
Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, a Louisiana state agency serving
as a NRDA trustee, has criticized BP's ability to influence the scientific studies
undertaken during cooperative assessment.os Namely, the trustees have to

104. For detailed discussion of the gag order during early phases of the Exxon Valdez oil spill
NRDA process, see HUNT, supra note 87, at 58-60.
105. Id. at 59 ("An unintended consequence of this secrecy was that researchers often did
not know they had data or questions in common because they simply did not talk about their
research openly.").
1o6.
See 2012 DEEPWATERHORJZONSTATUS REPORT, supranote i,at 15 (explaining the various
technical working groups and their efforts at cross resource collaboration); see also National
Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA), NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.
noaa.gov/deepwaterhorizon/data/nrda.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (making available preassessment data and noting that "Releasing NRDA 'Pre-assessment' science data is rarely done in
the NRDA process, but it was decided in the interest of transparency, and because of the
heightened interest in this particular spill, that this information would be made public"); NRDA
Workplans and Data, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.gulfspillrestoration.
noaa.gov/oil-spill/gulf-spill-data/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (containing workplans and data for
various NRDA studies).
107. See Press Release, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., NRDA Trustees Announce $1
Billion Agreement to Fund Early Gulf Coast Restoration Projects (Apr. 21, 201 1), available at
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2o 1/2011042inrdarestoration.html. Even without
creative settlements like the Early Restoration Fund, government trustees can take advantage of
funding available through the OPA Trust Liability Fund, which was created through legislation
to address some of the funding issues highlighted during the Exxon spill. For a general discussion
of funding for the BP Gulf Oil Spill response, see VANN & MELTZ, supra note 9, at 14-15.
1o8.
See Status of the Deepwater Horizon NaturalResourcesDamage Assessment: HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Water & Wildlife of the S. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, 112th Cong. (2011)
[hereinafter Deepwater Horizon Hearing] (prepared statement of Garret Graves, Chair, Coastal
Protection and Restoration Authority of Louisiana), available at http://www.epw.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing.ID=b9947fce-8o02a-23ad-4fcb-a42cc
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wait for BP to sign off on assessment projects in order for those projects to be
funded by BP.1o9 In that way, BP influences the science through delay or by
refusing to fund certain studies that are "contrary to their legal interests."-0o
This example, and those drawn from the Exxon Valdez spill, serve as
important reminders of the kind of influence that litigation can play during
the NRDA process, even absent affirmative efforts to increase transparency or
structurally insulate science from litigation.
B.

THE FUNDINGEFFECTAND ADVANTAGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Science funded by government trustees is not the only science influenced
by the adversarial posture of NRDA. In a parallel effort, defendants carry out
their own scientific agendas. In the case of the Exxon spill, Exxon Corporation
was a major player in the generation of science. It privately funded at least
400 studies in the 20 years after the spill,-' and was notorious for keeping
hundreds of private and university scientists on its payroll. 12
Even in the aftermath of the DeepwaterHorizon spill, where there is great
emphasis on cooperative assessment,"5 BP and the trustees are also

54a81 9 6&WimessID=of 4 c8bcd-f29 7-4 ba3-gbo8-c7 4 d3co615a2 (levying criticism and providing
examples of BP's leverage).
lo9.

See id.

11o. Id. at 5 .
As of May 2013, Exxon Corporation's bibliography of research related to the Exxon spill
11.
contained citations to over 5oo scientific journal articles on research funded by Exxon. See
VALDEZSCIENCES, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EXXONMOBIL-SPONSORED EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL RESEARCH

(2013), availableat http://www.valdezsciences.com/docs/ExxonMobil-Sponsored% 2oPublications
%2oBibliography%2ofor%2owww.valdezsciences.com.pdf.
See HUNT, supra note 87, at 20 (describing the competition between state trustees,
112.
federal trustees, and Exxon to lock in experts in the wake of the Exxon spill); id. ("[T]he state
also locked in many nationally recognized experts to help document injury, conduct economic
studies, testify in court, and serve as peer reviewers of damage assessment science. Federal
attorneys also hired experts to guide them, and the two governments found themselves racing
each other and Exxon when it came to hiring Nobel prize winning economists and other worldrenowned scientists."); see also KRISTINA ALEXANDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4 139 6 , THE 20 10
OIL SPILL: NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT UNDER THE OIL POLLUTION ACT 15 (201 o),
availableat https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41396.pdf (noting that one of the NRDA issues
that was considered by Congress in the wake of the BP Gulf Oil Spill was "prohibiting responsible

parties from 'buying up' experts" (citing Mark Tran, BPDenies 'BuyingSilence' of Oil Spill Scientists,
GUARDIAN (July 23, 2010, 5:27 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2o1o/jul/23/
bp-oil-spill-scientists-silence)); Marc Caputo, BP Wasted No Time Preparingfor Oil Spill Lawsuits,
MCCLATCHYDC (July 3, 201 o), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2o1 o/o7/o3/96989/bp-wastedno-time-preparing-for.html ("BP swiftly signed up experts who otherwise would work for
plaintiffs.").
113.

See, e.g., 2012 DEEPWATER HORIZON STATUS REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining the

benefits of the cooperative assessment process); id. at 20 (discussing efforts since "the earliest
days" to approach the BP NRDA process cooperatively); see also BP NRDA REPORT, supra note 37,

at 7 (emphasizing that "[m]ore than 16o initial and amended work plans" have been developed
cooperatively).
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undertaking independent research to support their respective positions."4
Moreover, BP is the only one of the responsible parties that has elected to
participate in the cooperative assessment.' '5 And, even though BP is willing to
engage in cooperative assessment for some resources, BP and government
trustees are not working cooperatively to assess all resources. With respect to
lost human services, for example, trustees have explained that conflicting
conclusions are possible:
The lost human use assessment for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is
not a cooperative assessment. While some data are being collected
cooperatively (e.g., counts of beach visitation from aerial
overflights), the trustees and BP are analyzing the collected datasets
individually. Each party will use its data to arrive at separate
conclusions about the value of the lost use injury. Therefore, the
data being collected by both sides are not being made public at this
time because it may eventually be used in litigation if the two parties
6
cannot reach agreement.",
The degree to which conflicting views of science emerge from the NRDA
process is beautifully illustrated by research published in the aftermath of the
Exxon spill. On the merits, Exxon's studies often clashed with work by trustee
scientists. For each study that suggests a connection between the Exxon spill
and long-term injuries, there are counter-studies and accusations of faulty
study design."7 Indeed, decades after the Exxon spill, "[d]ebate continues
114.
BP describes four categories of data: NRDA Cooperative, BP NRDA Independent,
Trustee Independent, and Response. Gulf Science Data, BP, http://gulfsciencedata.bp.com/go/
doc/61 4 5 /1 9 4 22 5 8/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
115.
VANN & MELTZ, supra note 9, at 11 ("For the 20o Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the
responsible parties identified are BP Exploration and Production, Inc., Transocean Holdings Inc.,
Triton Asset Leasing GmbH, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc., Transocean Deepwater
Inc., Anadarko Petroleum, Anadarko E&P Company LP, and MOEX Offshore 2007 LLC. As of
April 2012, BP was the only responsible party participating in the cooperative NRDA process.").
116. 2012 DEEPWATERHORIZONSTATUS REPORT, supra note i, at 87.
117. See, e.g., Mark A. Harwell &John H. Gentile, Ecological Significance of ResidualExposures and
Effects from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 2 INTEGRATED ENVTL. ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 204, 22o-36

(2oo6) (presenting Exxon-funded research assessing the ongoing effects of the Exxon spill on 20
"valued ecosystem components" and, in doing so, illustrating the debate that persists within the
scientific literature). For a specific example of counter-studies, compare Stanley D. Rice et al.,
Impacts to Pink Salmon Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Persistence, Toxicity, Sensitivity, and
Controveny, 9 REvs. FISHERIES SCI. 165 (2001) (presenting trustee-funded research suggesting
long-term impacts from the oil spill),,with E.L. Brannon etal., Review of theExxon Valdez Oil Spill
Effects on Pink Salmon in Prince William Sound, Alaska, 2o REvs. FISHERIES SCI. 20, 57 (2012)

(presenting Exxon-funded research critiquing trustee-funded studies and concluding that "pink
salmon were not measurably damaged by the Exxon Valdez oil spill"). Also, compare Richard E.
Thorne & Gary L. Thomas, Herning and the "Exxon Valdez"Oil Spill: An Investigationinto Historical
Data Conflicts, 65 ICESJ. MARINE SCl. 44,48-49 (2oo8) (presenting government-funded research
proposing a new theory to explain the interrelationship between the Pacific herring fishery
collapse and the Valdez oil spill), with Gary D. Marty et al., Role of Disease in Abundance of a Pacific
Herring (Clupea pallasi) Population, 6o CANADIAN J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 1258, 1258-59
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about the amount of oil, its availability to organisms, and its possible effects
on ecological systems in the sound.""18 How much of this debate is genuine?
How much of this debate is part of a larger litigation strategy to manufacture
doubt and emphasize scientific uncertainty?
While delineating distinctions between intellectual and strategic debate
is difficult, a careful review of the post-Exxon scientific literature reveals some
striking patterns. First, government-sponsored research tends to openly
recognize the long-term impacts of oil spills, while corporate-sponsored
research tends to minimize impacts and offer alternative explanations for the
harm. Some studies, generally those funded by the Exxon Valdez Trustee
Council, conclude that "chronic, delayed, and indirect effects of oil spills
appear to have much longer and larger consequences on wildlife populations
and communities than previously assumed.""9 These studies examine the
lingering effects of the spill on a range of resources (from sea otters to
harlequin ducks) and a range of issues (from presence of oil to bioavailability
to long-term demographics). -° Other studies, generally those funded by
Exxon, declare that Prince William Sound has "effectively recovered" from
the Exxon spill and that "the physical stressors from [the spill] are completely
gone." 2 ' These studies commonly assert that any resources remaining on the

(2003) (presenting Exxon-funded research questioning the role of the Exxon spill on the 1993
Pacific herring fishery collapse).
1 18. Wiens, supranote 14, at 770.
iig. Daniel Esler et al., Cytochrome P4 5 oiA Biomarker Indication of Oil Exposure in Harlequin
Ducks up to 20 Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 29 ENVTL. TOxICOLOGY & CHEMISTRY 1 138,
1138 (2010) [hereinafter Esler et al., Harlequin Ducks]; see also Daniel Esler et al., Cytochrome
P4 5 oA Biomarker Indication of the Timeline of Chronic Exposure of Barrow's Goldeneyes to Residual
Exxon Valdez Oi4 62 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 609, 61o (2011) [hereinafter Esler et al.,
Goldeneyes] ("This work adds to a body of literature describing the timelines over which
vertebrates were exposed to residual Exxon Valdez oil and indicates that, for Barrow's goldeneyes
in Prince William Sound, exposure persisted for many years with evidence of substantially
reduced exposure by 2 decades after the spill."); Daniel H. Monson et al., Could Residual Oilfrom
the Exxon Valdez Spill Create a Long-Term Population "Sink"for Sea Otters in Alaska?, 21 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 2917, 2917 (2011) ("Our results suggest that residual oil can affect wildlife
populations on time scales much longer than previously believed and that cumulative chronic
effects can be as significant as acute effects."); Charles H. Peterson et al., Long-Term Ecosystem

Response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 302

SCIENCE 2o82, 2082 (2003)

("[I]n the Alaskan coastal

ecosystem, unexpected persistence of toxic subsurface oil and chronic exposures, even at
sublethal levels, have continued to affect wildlife."); Robert E. Thomas et al., Induction of DNA
Strand Breaks in the Mussel (Mytilus trossulus) and Clam (Protothaca staminea) Following Chronic
Field Exposure to PolycyclicAromatic Hydrocarbonsfrom the Exxon Valdez Sil 5 4 MARINE POLLUTION
BULL. 726, 726 (2007) ("[lit is generally accepted that long-term effects can result in serious
impacts at both the population and ecosystem level.").
120.
See, e.g., Esler et al., Goldeneyes, supra note i 19, at 61o (providing examples of research
discussing biomarkers studies used to detect ongoing exposure to oil); Jeffrey W. Short et al.,
Estimate of Oil Persistingon the Beaches of Prince William Sound 12 Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill, 38 ENVrL. SCI. & TECH. 19, 19 (2004) (providing examples of research on the lingering
amount of oil more than a decade after the spill).
121.
Harwell & Gentile, supra note 117, at 239.
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Trustee Council's injured list "are responding to other natural [or]
anthropogenic stressors that have nothing to do with [the Exxon spill] or its
cleanup activities."112 They argue that the long-term influence of the Exxon
spill pales in comparison to the global climatic shifts and natural processes:
"Following the spill-aftermath period, [Prince William Sound] also essentially
recovered from [the Exxon Valdez oil spill], and anthropogenic factors again
have considerably less influence on the [Prince William Sound] ecosystem
than do natural processes."'2s
Together, this literature suggests that NRDA science is susceptible to the
same kind of "funding effect" that scholars have observed outside the NRDA
context.,2 4 The funding effect is the phenomenon where "privately funded
research biases the results toward the financial interests of the sponsors."15
The most infamous example of the conflicts of interest that arise between
science and its funders is the tobacco industry's well-documented efforts to
manufacture science.' 6 There are other examples as well in the areas of
pharmaceutical and chemical toxicity research.' -7
Given the high stakes tied directly to scientific findings, it is not surprising
that NRDA science is susceptible to the funding effect. Some scientists
studying the impacts of the Exxon Valdez oil spill appear to recognize the
funding effect in NRDA science-or they at least accept that funding sources
can create perceptions of bias.1 8 To that end, in response to controversy and
debate over the causal link between the Exxon spill and the collapse of the

122.

Id.

123. Harwell et al., supra note 24, at 716; see also Harwell & Gentile, supranote 117, at 238-39
(describing "habitat alteration, climate change, overexploitation of living resources, and invasive
species as the most important environmental stressors affecting the nation's environment").
124. See Krimsky, supra note 69, at 46 (discussing "the effects of the academic funding
structure and financial conflicts of interest on the integrity of scientific research"); see alsoWagner
& Michaels, supra note 75, at 122 (discussing how sponsors in high-stakes cases "face strong
incentives to design and report research in ways most favorable to their interests and to suppress
adverse results provided they can do so without detection").
125.
Sheldon Krimsky, PublicationBias, Data Ownership, and the FundingEffect in Science: Threats
to the Integrity of Biomedical Research, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE
DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 6 1, 73 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds. 2oo6).

126. See Krimsky, supra note 69,at 55-5 7 (describing the various strands of "tobacco science"
that have been documented as products of self-interest); Elizabeth Laposata et al., Tobacco Industry
Influence on the American Law Institute's Restatements of Torts and Implicationsfor Its Conflict of Interest
Policies, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2012) (describing the tobacco industry's effect on the Restatement
(3d) of Torts).
127. See Sheldon Krimsky, Do Financial Conflicts of Interest Bias Research? An Inquiy into the
"FundingEffect"Hypothesis,38 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 566, 569 (2013) (discussing various case
studies where the funding effect has been documented outside of the tobacco context in
"pharmacoeconomic[] and chemical toxicity research").
128. Professor Krimsky has certainly recognized that there is at the very least a perception of
bias when research outcomes align with the interests of the funding party. Krimsky, supra note
69, at 57 ("Financial interest by scientists undoubtedly affects the popular culture's perception
of scientific reliability.").
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Pacific herring fishery, a government scientist teamed up with an Exxon
scientist to critically review the state of the literature and provide an objective
analysis. In their paper, the scientists openly acknowledge the need for crossparty research in order to advance scientific understanding: "These objectives
were undertaken from the broadest perspective possible, as evidenced by the
differing affiliation and support of the 2 authors. We believe this review is
urgently needed to provide a clearer and more logical interpretation of the
data than has been done to date."29
The post-Exxon research also suggests that responsible parties have a
particular incentive to emphasize (or generate) scientific uncertainty within
the literature.so Some Exxon-funded research emphasizes the difficulty of
sorting out "noise" from actual causes: "The problem is how to distinguish the
signal of an ecological effect from the noise of natural variability and how to
distinguish reductions in a population caused by [the Exxon Valdez oil spill]
from reductions caused by other stressors."1s'
Of course, for responsible parties, the uncertainty is beneficial. In fact,
generating debate within the scientific literature has direct and predictable
consequences on the outcome of cases. Because the plaintiff bears the burden
of proof, scientific uncertainty on issues like causation will almost always
benefit the defendant. This is true in the toxic-tort context as well, where some
courts have seen fit to shift the burden of proof to the defendant in order to
rectify the imbalance.,s3 Similarly, in the NRDA context, the uncertainty, or
"noise," makes the task of filtering out actual causes from background
stressors more difficult and undermines the plaintiffs ability to meet her
burden of proof. In this way, it is in Exxon's best interests to explore and

129.
Ralph A. Elston & Theodore R. Meyers, Effect of Viral Hemorrhagic Septicemia Virus on
PacificHerringin Prince William Sound, Alaska, from x989 to 2005,83 DISEASES AQUATIc ORGANISMS
223, 224 (2009).

130.
Cf Michaels & Monforton, supra note 5o ,at 17 ("Polluters and manufacturers of
dangerous products have waged sophisticated campaigns to manufacture uncertainty about the
scientific evidence used to support public health protection and victim compensation.").
131. Harwell & Gentile, supranote 117, at 238.
132.
See, e.g.,
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 198o) (shifting the burden to
DES manufacturers to prove that they could not have produced the injury-causing product);
Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Cal. 1948) (en banc) (allowing burden-shifting when two
defendants, both before the court, negligently shot plaintiff and plaintiff could not prove which
defendant actually caused the injury). Scholars have also proposed burden-shifting when there
are extraordinary challenges preventing plaintiffs from proving causation. SeeAlexandra B. Klass,
Pesticides, Children'sHealth Policy, and Common Law Tort Claims, 7 MINN.J.L. Sci. & TECH. 89, 92,
136 (2005) (arguing that burden-shifting would be appropriate in cases where the plaintiff can
prove the pesticide manufacturer "failed to conduct reasonably available testing to gather
currently unavailable scientific evidence on the issue of causation"). Other scholars have
advocated for relaxed causal tests in recognition of the systematic disadvantage of plaintiffs
seeking to prove complex toxic tort injuries while bearing the burden of proof. See, e.g.,
Berger,
supranote 25; Gold, supra note 25; Rostron, supranote 25.
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emphasize the many stressors that could be causing long-term perturbations
in the Prince William Sound ecosystem.33
Offering up counter-studies or counter-explanations for ecosystem harm
is one way to deflect liability and undermine the government's ability to prove
causation. Another strategy for deflecting liability is to directly attack the
credibility of government science.,34 There is evidence of this too in the postExxon scientific literature. In one study, which examined the viability of
research on long-term impacts of the Exxon spill on pink salmon, the authors
suggested that the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council's "conclusions about oil
effects on pink salmon were influenced by the need for litigation to identify
damages and recover monetary compensation for the injuries to natural
resources."'35 The authors went on to caution that "[a]ccurate information is
the key in establishing confidence that we understand the ecological impact
of the Exxon Valdez... spill and that such understanding is founded on reliable
science.",3 6 Exxon funded that study, whose purpose was to reconcile
conflicting pink salmon research. This is not the first time that Exxon-funded
research has cast doubt on government science-either indirectly by
producing counter-studies or directly by questioning biased motivations of
government researchers. '37

Many of these examples come from scientific literature published after
government trustees settled claims for natural resource damages in 1991 . One
might wonder why incentives remain to cast doubt on the science even when
the parties settled damage claims. The incentive comes from the reopener
provision that government trustees negotiated to include in the natural

133.
For an example of Exxon-funded research attempting to model the relative importance
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill versus other natural or anthropogenic stressors on the Prince William
Sound ecosystem, see generally Harwell et al., supranote 24.
134.
See MCGARITY &WAGNER, supra note 65, at 128.
135. Brannon et al., supra note 1 17, at 57.
136. Id.
137. See Wayne G. Landis, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Revisited and the Dangers of Normative
Science, 3 INTEGRATED ENvTL. ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 439, 439 (2007) ("Examination of the
environmental risk assessment and toxicology literature reveals that the symptoms of normative
science are common and the implications widespread."); Wiens, supra note 14, at 769 ("When a
large environmental accident occurs, we expect large ecological consequences. When the
disruption is due to human activities, as is the case with an oil spill, we expect the worst. Emotions
can override sound judgment, and litigation can polarize positions and foster advocacy.
Hyperbole replaces hypotheses, and science suffers the consequences."); John A. Wiens, O/W,
Seabirds, and Science: The Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spil 46 BIOSCIENCE 587, 588 (1996)
(discussing the scientific research in the wake of the Exxon spill and remarking that " [ t] he studies
also provide some insights into how the scientific process itself may be affected by such wellpublicized environmental accidents and into the relationships among preconceptions, advocacy,
and science"); see alsoWagner, supranote 19, at 1654 ("Individual companies or trade associations
engaged in the production of oil, lead, asbestos, and beryllium have all actively worked to
discredit research that, if widely understood and accepted, would likely result in substantial
liability, regulation, and market costs." (citations omitted)); id. at 1655 (using Exxon's attempts
to discredit government researchers after the Exxon spill).
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resource damage settlement agreement for the Exxon Valdez oil spill. By
creating an opportunity to make a $1oo million, one-time demand for
unanticipated injuries discovered after settlement, the reopener clause singlehandedly keeps long-term injuries relevant in terms that matter most:
litigation, liability, and money.,s This third important observation is taken up
in greater detail in Part IV.
In the end, it may well be that truly unmasking the injuries caused by oil
spills and toxic releases is difficult not only because the science is hard, but
also because of the byproduct of uncertainty created when government
science competes with private science. In that way, the uncertainty generated
by competing scientific studies makes sorting out root causes even more
difficult and interferes with public policy assessments of risk of certain types
of activities. Dampening the noise will be critical to the tasks of optimizing the
utility of NRDA science outside the courtroom.
C. PROBLEMS OFPARITY AND ASYMMETRICAL TRANSPARENCY
One final aspect of litigation's influence on NRDA science is worth
considering: There are asymmetrical standards of transparency that apply to
government science and private science.'s9 This asymmetry skews the
knowledge base and makes more difficult the task of discerning root causes.
It does so by forcing trustees and the public to assess injuries based on the
scientific information that is available, rather than based on the sum total of
scientific information that exists.
Consider the relative standards of access and transparency that govern
private and government science. On the government side, NRDA science is
rooted in a legal framework that invites public scrutiny and transparency.
Most obviously, the NRDA process itself is conducted in accordance with
regulations from the Oil Protection Act of I 990 ("OPA") that have undergone
public notice and comment rulemaking.4o The OPA regulations establish
protocols that govern all aspects of damage assessment, including activities
such as coordination with responsible parties,14' data collection,142 and
developing restoration alternatives. 43 Trustees have an added incentive to

138.

For more detailed discussion of how reopener clauses have shaped incentives to

generate uncertainty in the scientific literature post-Exxon, see infra Part V.B.

139. SeeJasanoff, supra note 26, at 30 (noting "that codes of scientific openness are not
uniformly observed or enforced in practice, thereby creating asymmetries in the standards
applied to privately and publicly sponsored research").
140. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 99O.lo-.66 (2014) (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association
regulations governing NRDA); 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.1o-93 (2014) (Department of Interior
regulations governing NRDA).
141.
See s5 C.F.R. § 990.14.
142.

See id. § 990.43.

143.

See id. § 990.54.

1534

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10oo: 1503

adhere to the regulatory protocols because doing so creates a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the trustees' ultimate assessment. ,44
At a minimum, these regulations telegraph how injury assessment and
restoration planning will take place. In addition, the regulations and other
governing statutes ensure that certain information will be available to public
scrutiny. In these ways, the NRDA framework for transparency is part of a
larger governmental effort towards achieving legitimacy through
transparency in agency decision-making.-45 The OPA regulations, for
instance, require trustees to assemble and make publicly available an
administrative record that "document[s] the basis for their decisions
pertaining to restoration."'4 6 That record must include "(a] ny relevant data,
investigation reports, scientific studies, work plans, quality assurance plans,
and literature" that was used to develop restoration plans.,47 In addition, the
process of developing restoration plans (which includes identifying injured
resources) is subject to the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").,4 8
Through the NEPA process, information and analysis regarding alternatives
are subject to public review and comment. Given that one of the fundamental
tenets of NEPA is public participation,'49 the NEPA process ensures a certain
degree of transparency.

144. See id. § 990.13 ("Any determination or assessment of damages to natural resources
made by a Federal, State, or Indian trustee in accordance with this part shall have the force and
effect of a rebuttable presumption on behalf of the trustee in any administrative or judicial
proceeding under OPA.").
145. See, e.g., Jasanoff, supra note 26, at 21 ("With the passage of the federal Administrative
Procedure Act in 1946, the U.S. government recognized the right of citizens to participate in
agency rulemaking and an associated right to receive information, including scientific and
technical information, in order to effectuate the goal of informed participation. Later U.S.
statutes have consistently expanded the public's right to know and to assess the information
underlying governmental decisions." (citing Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 1o9-41,
6o Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.)).
146. 15 C.F.R. § 990.45; see, e.g.,
Administrative Record Index, U.S. DEP'T INTERIOR, http://
www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/adminrecord/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
147. 15 C.F.R. § 990.45(a)(2).
148. See id. § 990.23 (making NEPA applicable to NRDA restoration actions); see alsoNational
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2012). To comply with NEPA
obligations, trustees for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill have begun work on a draft programmatic
environmental impact statement that considers "alternatives to restore natural resources,
ecological services, and recreational use services injured or lost as a result of the DeepwaterHorizon
oil spill." See Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill; Draft Programmatic and Phase III Early Restoration
Plan and Draft Early Restoration Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, 78 Fed. Reg.
73,555, 73,555 (Dec. 6, 2013).
149. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) ("[NEPA]
ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider,
detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts; it also guarantees that the
relevant information will be made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in
both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.").
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Many of the transparency protocols that are now part of the NRDA
process are reactions to lessons learned after the Exxon Valdez oil spill.15o In
fact, government trustees that are managing the NRDA process for the
DeepwaterHorizonoil spill have deliberately made transparency a priority: "One
of the key actions the trustees have taken to ensure enhanced transparency is
the public distribution of cooperative assessment work plans and data during
the NRDA process."'5' Trustees have also developed several websites to
compile and disseminate information on the development of the NRDA
process.5 2 Some of the data released to the public through these websites is
ordinarily kept confidential until the parties have settled their NRDA
claims.153 In addition, as part of the NEPA process, trustees have held public
meetings and solicited public comments regarding restoration planning
efforts.154
In contrast to the openness and formalized processes that govern NRDA
science funded by trustees, there is relatively little oversight of private science
agendas. Only if the NRDA process proceeds to active litigation will private
science be subject to discovery. Otherwise, there is no regulatory mechanism
or statute that requires access to privately generated NRDA science.,55 This
leaves defendants with the ability to selectively release private science and
6
skew information available to the greater scientific community.,5

15o. Deepwater Horizon Hearing, supra note io8 (statement of Cynthia Dohner, Regional
Director, Southeast Region, United States Fish & Wildlife Service, United States Department of
the Interior), availableat http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&
FileStore-id= 5 7df 5 ffc-d62d- 4 fco-9 4 4 f-4 9 sbb 9 88 7 3 fb ("The NRDAR process is built upon many
of the lessons learned from the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska.").
151.
Deepwater Horizon Hearing, supra note i o8 (statement of Tony Penn, Deputy Chief,
Assessment and Restoration Division, Office of Response and Restoration, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, United States Department of Commerce), available at http://www.
epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=c 1e77edg-c 1be-4 a2d-8b
87-65eI717e 1518.
152.

Id.; see also Gulf Spill Restoration, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. http://www.

gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov (last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (providing information regarding the
NRDA process, including access to over 1oo pre-assessment work plans).
153. Deepwater Horizon Hearing, supra note io8 (statement of Tony Penn, Deputy Chief,
Assessment and Restoration Division, Office of Response and Restoration, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, United States Department of Commerce), available at http://www.
epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore-id=c 1 e77ed9-c 1 be-4 a2d-8b
87-65e1717e15s8.
154.

Id. at 4.

155.
Cf Wagner, supra note ig, at 1664 (describing the paucity of laws in the toxics
regulatory context, requiring production of "vital information on the externalities" created by
private actions); id. at 1699-1711 (discussing the various laws that private actors can used to
shield science from public disclosure).
156. Id. at 1645 (noting that private actors have an "informational advantage" because they
can "use several legal protections to actively exclude others from accessing the basic information
and physical data needed to assess externalities"); cf Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and
Chemical Toxicity: DesigningLaws to Produceand UseData, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1795, 1813 (1989) ("As
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Some of the problems of access and asymmetry within NRDA are
addressed by cooperative assessment. The regulations adopted by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association ("NOAA") under the Oil
Pollution Act of 199o'57 are sensitive to the informational issues that arise

when government scientists and corporate-funded scientists are working on
parallel, competing scientific agendas. In particular, NOAA's implementing
regulations encourage cooperation between trustees and corporate
defendants during the NRDA assessment process.,58 Trustees and BP work
along-side one another to advance a similar scientific agenda. In theory, this
cooperation generates a single body of science that is open to public access.,59
Despite the cooperative assessment process, however, problems of
information parity persist. For one thing, the cooperative assessment process
is voluntary. The trustees are required to invite all the responsible parties to
participate in the NRDA process, but the parties are not obliged to accept the
invitation., 6o In the case of the Deepwater Horizon spill, BP is the only
responsible party participating in the cooperative assessment process.,6, This
means there is still the potential for litigation noise and information
asymmetry from science generated by non-participating parties.' 6. In fact,
despite efforts of trustees to remain as transparent as possible, trustees are
also acutely aware that "NRDA is a legal process, designed to resolve liability
through restoration for the American public. The legal nature of damage
assessment requires a degree of confidentiality to preserve the government's
ability to make the strongest damage claim possible on behalf of the public in
settlement negotiations and litigation."' 63 Given that NRDA is fundamentally
long as no way exists for buyers to identify the toxic effects of specific chemicals, there is no
commercial incentive for chemical producers to identify and publicize them.").
157. Oil Pollution Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. 101-38o, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C., & 46 U.S.C.).
158.

See VALERIE ANN LEE ET AL., THE NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT DESKBOOK

402 (2002); see also 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c) (2014).

159.

See 2012 DEEPWATER HORIZON STATUS REPORT, supra note 1, at 21 (explaining that

"[o] nce they have undergone a comprehensive quality control check, all data obtained through
the cooperative process is publicly available at http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/oilspill/gulf- spill-data/").
16o. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.14 (c) (1) ("Trustees must invite the responsible parties to participate
in the natural resource damage assessment .... ").
161. Potentially responsible parties identified thus far are BP Exploration and Production Inc.,
Transocean Holdings Inc., Triton Asset Leasing GmbH, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling
Inc., Transocean Deepwater Inc., Anadarko Petroleum, Anadarko E&P Company LP, and MOEX
Offshore 2007 LLC. Discharge of Oil from Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well, Gulf of Mexico;
Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning, 75 Fed. Reg. 6o,8oo, 6o,8oo-ol (Oct. 1, 2010).
162. For an example of where trustees anticipate conflicting science to emerge after the
DeepwaterHorizon oil spill, see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
163. Deepwater Horizon Hearing, supra note lo8 (statement of Tony Penn, Deputy Chief,
Assessment and Restoration Division, Office of Response and Restoration, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, United States Department of Commerce), available at http://www.
epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore-id=c 1e77ed9-c 1 be-4 a2d-8b
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an adversarial process, cooperative assessment neither completely changes
the adversarial nature of the NRDA process, nor ensures that trustees and
defendants speak with a single voice.'64
Setting cooperative assessments aside, the asymmetry between
government science and private science puts corporate defendants like Exxon
or BP at a distinct informational advantage-defendants are privy to the
government science through public access channels while at the same time
allowed to shield their private findings from scrutiny. In this way, the
information asymmetry created by the adversarial context of the NRDA
process generates additional litigation noise. Professor Sheldon Krimsky, wellknown for his work on conflicts of interest in policy-relevant science, has made
similar observations in the pharmaceutical context:
Conflicts of interest in producing research are exacerbated by the
fact that the pharmaceutical industry is in control of vast amounts of
information, much of which remains secret or is shared as privileged
business information with regulatory agencies. The practice of
suppressing data unfavorable to industry's bottom line is not prima
facie illegal, but it delays the science and can cost lives. Science is
self-correcting, but it may take years for that correction. The cost in
lives that may result from sequestered data must be weighed against
the rights of companies to their confidential business information. ,65
Like other types of policy-relevant science, NRDA science is potentially
undermined by structural asymmetries that shield access to private science. In
particular, asymmetrical transparency adds to the litigation noise and
impedes the ability of scientists to separate real impacts from those created by
the distractions of litigation posturing. i66 In examining "sequestration" in the
realm of public science, Professor Sheilajasanoff has aptly observed that "l[t] o
be useful, scientific information has to be available to those in a position to
'' 67
appraise and use it.,

And while Professor Krimsky is hopeful that the "self-correcting" nature
of science will eventually uncover the truth, 68 his optimism might not apply
87-65es7s7es5i8; see also id. ("[T]rustees have developed new public information sharing
protocols to address the American public's unprecedented request for NRDA information, while
at the same time, preserving the trustees' responsibility to ensure a strong legal case.").
164. Cf supranotes 1o8- io and accompanying text (discussing testimony explaining that the
cooperative assessment process still leaves corporate defendants like BP with dominant leverage
in setting the scientific agenda since they are ultimately the source of the funding).
165. SeeKrimsky, supranote 125, at 74.
166. Cf Jasanoff, supra note 26, at 29-30 (discussing research on the widely used pesticide
atrazine as an example of how asymmetry facilitates the manufacture of uncertainty); Wagner, supra
note 19, at 1650 (noting that in the toxics regulatory context, the "easiest approach" for private
actors to obscure adverse scientific research is "simply to publicize only the positive information
about a product or activity, while keeping potentially damaging information private").
167. Jasanoff, supra note 26, at 26.
168. Krimsky, supra note 125, at 74.
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in the NRDA context. Unlike laboratory research or human studies research
that can be replicated given enough time and funding, scientific discovery is
borne out of crisis moments and opportunities to learn from ecosystems as
injuries unfold in real time and place. The observation of nature's reaction to
acute toxic exposure cannot necessarily be replicated, and indeed, hopefully
will not occur again. In that way, the stakes of asymmetrical access and
litigation noise in NRDA may well be higher than in situations where research
takes place in the laboratory.
IV. STRUCTURAL COMPLICATIONS OF LONG-TERM INJURIES

At first glance, many of the practical problems that adversarial science
creates might seem to be resolved if the parties can simply get past the
unpleasantries of litigation. After all, quick settlements would necessarily
diminish the stakes that responsible parties have in scientific outcomes and
therefore dampen undue influence and uncertainty-generating agendas. At
the same time, if trustees can focus on restoration instead of litigation, the
scientific agenda would no longer be subservient to litigation concerns or
settlement posturing. This was, in fact, a welcome byproduct of the relatively
early natural resource damage settlement following the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
In that case, the spill occurred in March 1989 and natural resource damage
claims were settled less than three years later in October 1991. Because the
settlement released tensions between lawyers and scientists, at least one
member of the Trustee Council was quoted as saying that the science program
"never got really good until after the [natural resource damage]
6
settlement."1 9
In the end, however, early settlements are not the complete solution. The
most fundamental problem with early settlements is that long-term injuries
take time to manifest. The close study of the Exxon spill, for example, has
shown that oil can linger in the marine ecosystem and subject multiple levels
of species to toxic exposure for decades after the spill.170 An examination of
the scientific literature also demonstrates that determining long-term impacts
is a complex issue that takes more time than is available.17, This timing issue
is not unique to the Exxon Valdez oil spill-long latency periods are

169.

HUNT, supra note 87, at 65 (quoting Stan Senner, a restoration planner) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

170.

See Knudsen, supra note 22, at 484-90 (assembling the scientific literature in the long-

term wake of the Exxon spill and discussing the paradigm shift that recognizes long-term injuries
after oil spills are more substantial than previously thought); see also supra note s 19 and

accompanying text.
171. See Harwell & Gentile, supra note 117, at 2o8 ("If one requires precise answers before
makingjudgments about ecological significance in a complex environmental issue, then one may
have to wait a very long time .... ").
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characteristically problematic for injuries resulting from chronic toxic
exposure.7 2
Because long-term harms do not manifest on a litigation timeline, early
settlements run the risk of underestimating the magnitude and extent of longterm injuries.17 In addition, early settlements may mean cutting short
scientific study. In that sense, some science, even adversarial science, may be
preferable to no science on issues like long-term harm.,74
If early settlements pose structural problems for long-term injuries, the
question is whether trustees have tools to address those problems. One way
that trustees have traditionally addressed the structural problem of long-term
injuries has been through reopener clauses. In fact, government trustees
responding to the Exxon Valdez oil spill approached the NRDA settlement with
long-term injuries in mind and included a "reopener provision" to offset the
risk of settling in the face of incomplete knowledge.75 The reopener allowed
the government trustees to make a one-time claim of up to an additional $ oo
million for natural resource damages that were "unanticipated" at the time of
the settlement, September 25, 1991.176 The trustees were given a window of
time between 2002 and 2oo6 to make a reopener demand:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, between
September 1, 2002, and September 1, 2oo6,Exxon shall pay to the
Governments such additional sums as are required for the
performance of restoration projects in Prince William Sound and
other areas affected by the Oil Spill to restore one or more
populations, habitats, or species which, as a result of the Oil Spill,
have suffered a substantial loss or substantial decline in the areas
affected by the Oil Spill; provided, however, that for a restoration

172.

See supra notes

23-27

and accompanying text.

173. Government trustees for the Exxon spill, for example, settled the NRDA claims in 199 1,
less than three years after the spill. See Agreement and Consent Decree, United States v. Exxon
Corp., No. A91-o82 CIV (D. Alaska Oct. 9, i9i), available at http://www.arlis.org/docs/
vol l/A/ 4 29 6 4 164.pdf. At the time, they did not know what long-term injuries would manifest in
the long-term wake of the spill. Certainly at the time of settlement, the trustees could not even
have speculated as to whether the complete collapse of the Pacific herring fishery was caused by
the Exxon spill-that collapse did not happen until 1993 and now is the center of debate over its
causal connection to the spill. See generally Sanne Knudsen, A PrecautionaryTale: Assessing Ecological
DamagesAfter the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST.THOMAs L.J. 95 (2009) (assembling scientific

literature on the herring collapse).
174. Cf Jasanoff, supranote 26,at 40 ("In civil cases, early settlement may deter follow-up studies
of affected populations, thereby rendering invisible the longer term health and environmental effects
that might have come to light through continued research." (footnote omitted)).
175.
For a detailed history of the Exxon Reopener, see generally HuNT, supra note 87, at 248-50;
William H. Rodgers, Jr. et al., The Exxon Valdez Repener. NaturalResources Damage Settlements and Roads
Not Taken, 22 ALASKAL. REV. 135 (2005).

176.

Agreement and Consent Decree, supra note 173,

18.
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project to qualify for payment under this paragraph the project must
meet the following requirements:
(a) the cost of a restoration project must not be grossly
disproportionate to the magnitude of the benefits anticipated from
the remediation; and
(b) the injury to the affected population, habitat, or species could
not reasonably have been known nor could it reasonably have been
anticipated by any Trustee from any information in the possession
of or reasonably available to any Trustee on the Effective Date.'77
This provision gave government trustees the assurances they desired
regarding unanticipated future harms, and secured the blessing of the public
and Judge Holland on the proposed consent decree.,7 Notably, such
reopener provisions are fairly common in other natural resource damage
settlements as well.,79
In theory, a reopener provision is a promising approach to NRDA
settlements. Indeed, reopener clauses are useful precisely because they leave
open the possibility for further liability for future, unknown harms. In this
way, reopeners preserve the relevance of adversarial posturing with respect to
the long-term, ongoing study of the oiled ecosystem. Corporate defendants
like Exxon have incentives to fund research aimed at minimizing the longterm impacts of the oil spill. At the same time, trustees have an incentive to
fund research that links the oil spill to long-term adverse changes to the
ecosystem. For each party, there are financial incentives to either seek out or
stamp out patterns of long-term harm.
While reopeners could be celebrated for their encouragement of
ongoing research on chronic toxic exposure, patterns within the scientific
literature after the Exxon spill suggest that reopeners may be extending the
adversarial nature of NRDA science beyond settlement. In particular, the

177. Id. 17.
178. See Rodgers et al., supra note 175, at 138 ("The Reopener helped seal the settlement.
The governments told Judge Holland that it was an important hedge against miscalculations or
excessive optimism, fueled by the desire to settle quickly."). The trustees were not the only ones
who seemed to appreciate the potential for long-term injuries. As Professor Bill Rodgers
highlighted in his original examination of the Exxon Reopener, the reopener clause "was opposed
by Exxon executives from the start." Id. at 139. In fact, settlement negotiations nearly ended
because of the EPA's insistence from the start that such a clause be included in the consent
decree. Id. The $ioo million reopener figure was a compromise from the original $300 million
proposed by the EPA. Id.
179.
See HUNT, supra note 87, at 31 (noting that "reopeners had become a routine part of
restoration settlements"). But see Government's Memorandum in Support of Agreement and
Consent Decree at 12, United States v. Exxon Corp., Nos. Agi-o82 CIV, Ag9-o83 CIV (D. Alaska
Oct. 8, 1991), available at http://www.arlis.org/docs/vol s/A/294858686.pdf (explaining that
the Exxon Reopener is "novel" because, unlike reopeners typically included in other NRDA
settlements, "Exxon commits to pay up to $too million for restoration of unanticipated
environmental harm, without any need for the Governments to establish Exxon's liability").
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science produced in the wake of the Exxon spill settlement suggests litigation
science may be outliving the settlement precisely because the reopener
provision leaves incentives for future claims on the table. Ultimately, there
may be some reason for approaching the allure of reopener provisions
skeptically.
To start, one indication of enduring litigation incentives is the sizeable
number of Exxon-funded studies devoted to critiquing or combating claims
of long-term impacts.' s ° The result is a body of internally divisive and
competing strands of scientific literature discussing long-term harms.,l8 One
strand points to the growing body of evidence of long-term impacts;, 82 the
other strand concludes that factors other than oil are at play.1s3 Though the
competing strands are not equally balanced in every case, the scientific
exchange in the (long-term) wake of the Exxon spill poignantly demonstrates
a pattern and practice of refuting causal links between the spill and long-term
18o.
See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussing Exxon-funded studies that
offer an alternative explanation of harm).
181.
See HUNT, supra note 87, at 177-78 (noting that contrasting studies between Exxon and
trustees are the norm); Harwell & Gentile, supra note 117, at 205 (acknowledging that the
literature concerning the ecological significance of the Exxon spill is "often highly diverse"). See
supra note 117 for examples of divisive research on the long-term impacts to pink salmon and
Pacific herring in Prince William Sound. For an example of divisive literature on the impacts to
sea otters at Northern Knight Island, compare James L. Bodkin et al., Long-Term Effects of the
'Exxon Valdez' Oil Spill: Sea Otter Foragingin the Intertidalas a Pathway of Exposure to Lingering Oil,
447 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 273, 284 (2012) ("The overlap of lingering oil in the
intertidal with intertidal foraging by sea otters provides a reasonable explanation for their slow
population recovery."), and James L. Bodkin et al., Sea Otter PopulationStatus and the Process of
Recovery from the 1989 'Exxon Valdez'Oil Spill, 241 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 237, 242
(2002) (attributing population-level effects on Northern Knight Island otters to subsurface oil
residues), with Mark A. Harwell et al., A QuantitativeEcologicalRisk Assessment of the Toxicological
Risks from Exxon Valdez Subsurface Oil Residues to Sea Otters at Northern Knight Island, PrinceWilliam
Sound, Alaska, 16 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 727, 727 (2010) ("[N]o plausible
toxicological risk exists from [subsurface oil residues] to the sea otter subpopulation at [Northern
Knight Island]."). For an example of divisive literature on the long-term impacts to harlequin
ducks, compare John A. Wiens et al., Assessing Cause-Effect Relationships in EnvironmentalAccidents:
HarlequinDucks and the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 17 CURRENT ORNITHOLOGY 131, 151-53 (2010)
(concluding that there is no evidence of ongoing population level impacts to harlequin ducks
from the Exxon spill), with Daniel Esler & Samuel A. Iverson, FemaleHarlequinDuck WinterSurvival
I Ito 14 YearsAfter theExxon Valdez Oil Spill, 74J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 471 (201o). For an example
of the literature on the lingering presence of oil, see Paul D. Boehm, Distributionand Weathering
of Crude Oil Residues on Shorelines 18 Years After the Exxon Valdez Spill 42 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 9210,
9210 (2oo8) (concluding that "[m]ost of the [Exxon Valdez] oil in [Prince William Sound] has
been eliminated due to natural weathering"). For a summary of Exxon-funded research
highlighting the ongoing debates regarding the long-term impacts to sea otters and harlequin
ducks, see Mark A. Harwell etal., QuantifyingPopulation-LevelRisks Using an Individual-BasedModel:
Sea Otters, HarlequinDucks, and the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 8 INTEGRATED ENVTL. ASSESSMENT &
MGMT. 503, 504--05 (2012).
182.
See supra note 119 (assembling the literature purporting to be part of a growing body of
research demonstrating substantial long-term harms in the wake of the Exxon spill).
183. See, e.g., Harwell et al., supra note 24; see also supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text
(discussing other Exxon-funded studies that offer an alternative explanation of harm).
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injury. Indeed, many of the examples provided in Part III.B to illustrate the
funding effect in NRDA science involve scientific studies undertaken after
settlement. In other words, the reopener provision appears to have been
driving incentives for generating ongoing uncertainty in the science.
One could of course argue that scientific debate over long-term harm is
expected given the difficulty of sorting out causation in complex ecosystems
and over a long time span. But there are also other, more obvious, signs that
the Exxon reopener provision is encouraging ongoing advocacy within the
science. Most notably, some of the language in the scientific literature tracks
the language of the reopener itself. On the one hand, Exxon-funded science
is more apt to focus on alternative causes to explain ongoing harm in Prince
William Sound, describe ongoing harm as "anticipated," or diminish the
significance of ongoing effects.' 8 4 On the other hand, science funded by
trustees is more apt to describe scientific findings as "unanticipated," speak in
terms of "shifting paradigms" of knowledge, or conclude that long-term
effects are more severe than "previously believed.", 8s5 Recall that the reopener
allows for additional damage awards in the event that trustees discover future
injuries that could not "reasonably have been anticipated" from the
information that the trustees had in their possession at the time of settlement.
By discussing long-term harms as either "anticipated" or "unanticipated,"
expected or unexpected, the scientists are adopting precisely the reopener
provision's operative language and frame. One synthetic study on the impact

184. See, e.g., Brannon et al., supra note 117 , at 57 (framing the story of the pink salmon to
underscore that some long-term losses were anticipated at the time of the spill, but then going
on to conclude that "[there is no evidence supporting the projected losses to the [Prince William
Sound] pink salmon that were anticipatedat the time of the spill" (emphasis added)); Harwell &
Gentile, supra note 117, at 223 (discussing and assembling literature on long-term impacts to
harlequin ducks and emphasizing that, "even in the absence of residual [Exxon Valdez oil],"
researchers have long "expected [recovery] to be slow" because of breeding patterns (emphasis
added)); id. at 220-36 (assembling the literature for 16 different species and evaluating whether
the Exxon Valdez oil spill caused an "ecologically significant" effect on each); cf Landis, supranote
137, at 44o (criticizing Harwell's work on ecological significance as little more than a policy
statement rather than a scientific investigation).
185.

DAN ESLER, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TR. COUNCIL, RESTORATION PROJECT FINAL REPORT:

QUANTIFYING TEMPORAL VARIATION IN HARLEQUIN

(2o08),

DUCK

available at http://www.arlis.org/docs/voli/A/

CYrOCHROME
4

275 5 73

5

P 4 5 o1A

7.pdf

INDUCTION 2

("Results

of the

[Nearshore Vertebrate Project] included the unanticipated finding that harlequin ducks had
elevated CYPi A induction in areas receiving oil from the Exxon Valdez spill." (emphasis added));
see also Esler et al., Harlequin Ducks, supra note 119, at 1138 ("One of the more remarkable and
unanticipatedfindings from this body of work was the length of time (at least a decade) over which
animals were exposed to residual oil and showed depression of various population demographic
attributes." (emphasis added)); Samuel A. Iverson & Daniel Esler, HarlequinDuck PopulationInjury
and Recovery Dynamics Following the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spi/, 2o ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS
1993, 2004 (2010) ("Our findings confirm assertions that effects of oil spills on wildlife
populations are expressed over much longertimeftames thanpreviously assumed." (emphasis added));
Monson et al., supra note 19, at 2917 ("[O]ur results suggest that residual oil can affect wildlife
populations on time scales much longer than previously believed...." (emphasis added)).
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of the Exxon spill on Pacific herring even discusses the significance of certain
56
findings in terms of their implications for the reopener clause.'
The ongoing influence of litigation in the post-settlement studies is even
obvious from the ways in which some scientists differentiate themselves and
8
refer to one another as either "agency scientists" or "non-agency scientists.", 7
By drawing these distinctions, the scientists signal to readers that who
conducts the science may be relevant to what conclusions were drawn. One
team of scientists, in a post-article disclaimer regarding funding, gave a
lengthy explanation as to why their work should not be discredited simply
8s
because it was funded by Exxon.'
In these ways, the reopener appears to be driving scientific research and
opening that research up to a more stealth form of adversarial science. The
influence of litigation is "stealth" because it infiltrates the science at a time
when the broader community might expect the adversarial phase of the
NRDA process to have concluded. Though this Article does not purport to
measure the magnitude of the reopener's influence on the quality of the
science, the awareness of scientists of the legal import of their findings
suggests an influence of litigation incentives on science that is plenty clear. At
the very least, the ongoing litigation posture is a distraction to the goal of
science-uncovering truth. Indeed, the perception of bias in the science is
particularly high when the outcome tracks the incentives of the sponsor and
the language tracks the legal standard set out in the reopener.
Because reopeners generate incentives to engage in advocacy science
beyond settlement, alternative approaches to long-term injury recovery might
be preferable. Any alternative solution for addressing long-term injuries
should consider the desire to preserve efforts at studying long-term impacts
of oil spills. Indeed, reopeners are successful in at least that respect-they
generate an incentive to continue to research long-term effects of chronic
exposure, long after the media hype has died down. So there is a silver lining.

S.D. RICE & M.G. CARLS, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TR. COUNCIL, RESTORATION PROJECT
186.
FINAL REPORT: PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND HERRING: AN UPDATED SYNTHESIS OF POPULATION
DECLINES AND LACK OF RECOVERY 15 (2007), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Store/

FinalReports/2oo5-05o794-Final.pdf (noting that if the "present day depressed population levels
are related to the oil spill and unexpected damages, a key criterion of the re-opener clause, would
be satisfied" (emphasis added)).
187. See, e.g., Brannon et al., supra note 117, at 2 2 (describing who belongs to the camp of
agency verses nonagency scientist).
188. Harwell & Gentile, supra note 117, at 239 (noting that funding was provided by Exxon
and then going on to explain that "[i]f anything, we began with a bias toward expecting to find
evidence of continuing ecological effects on [Prince William Sound] based on our cursory
reading of the popular science and public literature. We also felt, perhaps, an inherent bias,
derived from our collective 6o y[ears] of experience working in or for the government, toward
government-funded science rather than industry-funded science").
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PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The NRDA process, though it is fundamentally adversarial, focuses
attention on scientific research that might not otherwise be a priority. In that
way, NRDA science is an asset. But, it is an asset that is vulnerable to bias. The
key to capitalizing on NRDA science as an asset is to recognize its advocacybased origins and situate it in a framework that systematically dampens the
litigation noise and scientific in-fighting. Professor Sheila Jasanoff made a
similar observation related to public science in general: "Once we recognize,
moreover, that litigation is an indispensable aid to knowledge production,
procedures aimed at increased transparency... could be devised to improve
8
the quality and reliability of the science that lawsuits help generate." 9
In that effort, this Part offers three possibilities for harnessing the
promise of adversarial science in the NRDA context. The first solution
considers using permit fees to establish baseline data funds for developing
science in advance of disasters and outside the adversarial context. The
second solution addresses the structural challenges of long-term injuries and
proposes the use of a multiplier to resolve claims for long-term harms earlier
in the NRDA process while at the same time ensuring ongoing study of longterm impacts. The third solution takes on the problems of adversarial science
a bit more directly-it proposes the use of a rebuttable presumption to
encourage greater transparency in the science produced by non-government
interest.
Each of these solutions, which could operate independently or together,
offers ways of supporting NRDA science so that at least part of the research
can take place outside the advocacy context. Crafted with funding problems
in mind, these solutions provide ways of putting better information and more
funds into the hands of trustees early in the NRDA process. The aim is to
dampen litigation noise and create a structure where there is greater ability
to separate actual causes of harm from noise. Notably, both of these solutions
recognize the importance of NRDA science as an informational tool and are
designed to encourage ongoing scientific research in the area.
A. fUNDING THE BASELINE
One way to dampen litigation noise is to take science out of the
adversarial context. At first blush, such a suggestion may seem at odds with
the NRDA process itself, which is triggered only after a spill has occurred.
While it is true that the NRDA process is reactive by nature, not all of the
science has to be. In fact, there is a category of data-called baseline datathat measures pre-spill conditions and that scientists need to prepare NRDA
assessments.,9o In theory, this data could be collected in areas of oil
189. SeeJasanoff, supranote 26, at 44.
i9o. Natural resource damage statutes and regulations define injury and measure recovery
by deviations from pre-spill or pre-release conditions. See, e.g., Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 3 3 U.S.C.
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development or areas at risk for oil spills before a spill occurs.'9' In fact,
establishing a more robust understanding of baseline conditions would help
the NRDA process immensely. Often, one of the challenges to identifying the
extent and magnitude of natural resource injuries is the lack of baseline
data. 192 After the Exxon spill, for instance, injury to certain species was difficult
to assess because the size of populations before the spill were unknown.,93 In
addition, systematic information regarding baseline levels of hydrocarbon
and other toxic stressors in areas like the Prince William Sound were
unavailable.'94 Trustees responding to the DeepwaterHorizonoil spill are facing
similar challenges given that the Gulf of Mexico was not exactly pristine
before the spill.,95

Lack of baseline data forces the science into a reactive posture and makes
the process of assessing and restoring injuries in the wake of disasters more
challenging. It exacerbates the risks of adversarial science by generating
uncertainty and debate about even pre-spill conditions. To that end,
establishing causal links between an oil spill and subsequent population
§ 2706 (2012); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9 60 7 (f) (2012). OPA regulations define "recovery" as "the return of
injured natural resources and services to baseline." 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2014). "Baseline means

the condition of the natural resources and services that would have existed had the incident not
occurred." Id.; see also id. (allowing trustees to use "historical data, reference data, control data,
or data on incremental changes" to establish the baseline).
Usha Varanasi, Making Science Useful in Complex Political and Legal Arenas: A Case for
191.
FrontloadingScience in Anticipation of Environmental Changes to Support Natural Resource Laws and
Policies, 3 WASH.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 238, 256-57 (2013).
NATIONAL OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 43, at 183-84 ("Two sets of
192.
determinations-one concerning the baseline conditions against which damages to each species
or habitat will be assessed and another concerning the quantification of those damages-are
particularly difficult and consequential in terms of the overall results."); id. at 184 ("Because longterm historical data are often nonexistent or discontinuous, natural resource trustees are likely
to be disadvantaged by a lack of sufficient information to fully characterize the condition of
relevant ecosystems prior to the incident in question.").
See, e.g., EXXON VAIDEZ OIL SPILl TR. COUNCIL, 20 10 UPDATE: INJURED RESOURCES AND
193.
SERVICES 6 (201 o), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/universal/documents/publications/
2o loIRSUpdate.pdf ("For many of the resources affected by the spill there was limited or no recent
data on their status in 1989."); Harwell & Gentile, supra note 117, at 222 (acknowledging that
cormorants have not recovered after the Exxon spill but concluding that the lack of baseline data
makes it difficult to assess whether depressed populations are a result of the spill).
See Harwell & Gentile, supra note 117, at 2o8.
194.
NATIONAL OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 43, at 184 ("As OPA regulations
195.
indicate, 'baseline' for purposes of damage assessment is generally considered to be the condition
of the resource just prior to the spill. The precise application of this definition has particular
importance in the Gulf of Mexico context, where many coastal habitats have been substantially
degraded over decades-even centuries-under the pressure of ever-expanding industrial,
commercial, and residential development."); see also Varanasi, supra note 191, at 240 ("With its
disastrous impact on the Gulf Coast's ecology and economy, this spill has presented a great
challenge, especially to scientists who frantically gather thousands of samples from impacted
areas and, under dynamic conditions, try to generate numerous data reports to inform a
concerned public." (citations omitted)).
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decline is obviously more difficult when baseline information regarding
toxicity, exposure pathways, or pre-spill population numbers is unavailable.,96
Deficient baseline data also forces trustees to quickly measure the baseline in
the adversarial context of NRDA, which is more rushed and contentious.'97
At least one prominent scientist and professor, Dr. Usha Varanasi, has
observed that "conducting strategic and comprehensive scientific inquiry,
including hypothesis testing, is not possible during an intense crisis because
scientists are often faced with having to answer fragmented 'questions of the
day' and answers often managed as a public relations issue by diverse
parties."9 8 Based on her experience with major environmental disasters like
the Exxon spill and the Deepwater Horizon spill, Dr. Varanasi laments that
scientists must often make significant decisions regarding "human safety,
seafood contamination, damage to marine life, and economic losses" without
sufficient information. 199
One possibility for addressing data gaps is to investigate potential impacts
of oil spills and toxic substance releases on human health and the
environment before a crisis happens. This would require a sustained,
nationwide, and systematic approach to understanding and responding to
toxic releases. Dr. Varanasi calls this "frontloading the science."--- Such a
science program would do more than gather population data in areas at risk
for oil spills or toxic releases. It would develop protocols and accepted
methods for assessing injuries before the adversarial posture of NRDA arises:
Scenario building and development of a long-term strategy of
remediation (if the disaster does happen) should be studied and
debated in the open, and relevant, new methods should be
developed and validated beforehand so they can be standardized

196. See,e.g., Harwell & Gentile, supranote 117, at 214 (explaining that assessing the longterm impacts of an oil spill on ecosystem resources requires that there is "sufficient information
about pre-spill conditions confidently to understand recovery, or else recovery status can never
be determined").
197. NATIONAL OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 43, at 176 ("Americans watched
as the oil eventually came to rest along intermittent stretches of the Gulf coast. Before it arrived,
scientists rushed to collect crucial baseline data on coastal and water-column conditions.").
198. Varanasi, supra note 42, at 234; see also Rebecca M. Bratspies, A Regulatory Wake-Up Call:
Lessons from BP's Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVrL. L.J. 7, 28-30 (201 1)
(describing the regulatory requirements for determining environmental effects); Varanasi, supra
note 191, at 241 ("After each major crisis, there is a general consensus that a robust scientific
basis (or underpinning) and baseline data should be available beforehand.'(citations omitted)).
199. Varanasi, supra note 42, at 234.
200.
See Varanasi, supra note 191, at 240-41 (stating that the Deepwaterspill "demonstrates
once more that the assessment of injury to natural resources can be seriously hampered by lack of
knowledge about the prior state of the affected ecosystem" (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)). See generally Varanasi, supra note 42.
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and used confidently to measure contamination of seafood and to
assess biological effects of toxic contaminants from a spill.--While Dr. Varanasi urges the frontloading of science as a means of
putting much needed information in the hands of scientists working on postdisaster response, this Article suggests an additional rationale-it would
dampen litigation noise. To that end, encouraging science to take place
outside an overtly litigious setting may be more likely to foster coordination
and outcome-neutral study. At the very least, gathering baseline data outside
the NRDA context reduces the likelihood that baseline data will be the subject
of dispute, since there may be less perception of bias.
Better baseline data would also help make the NRDA process more
efficient. With baseline data available, trustees can focus their time and
resources on assessing the injuries, rather than scrambling to gather baseline
information. Indeed, for long-term injuries, baseline data may assist trustees
in separating resources that are in fact suffering from prolonged harm from
those whose populations exhibit natural variability.o2 In addition, if scientists
have a foundational understanding of what species and other resources are
the driving elements of the ecosystem, trustees can develop post-spill science
agendas that focus on keystone elements and gather data for resources that
are known indicators of greater ecosystem health.
Even if frontloading science is a good idea, scientific study requires
funding. It is possible that the government could fund baseline research in
areas where oil drilling and transport take place. Given that government
agencies already face budget constraints, however, expecting agencies to
allocate limited funds towards research that might one day be necessary for
assembling an NRDA claim is not realistic.203 Indeed, government funding for
ongoing baseline data collection wanes despite congressional efforts. To that
end, when Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 199o in the aftermath of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill, it naturally recognized the value of undertaking "a
comprehensive program of oil pollution research."2°4 As part of that effort,
Congress created a 13-member Interagency Coordinating Committee and
tasked it with developing a research and technology plan that would, among
other things, "identify significant oil pollution research gaps."o5 Developing
baseline data for use in decision-making was among the long wish list of
research efforts that Congress required the Committee to consider.206 Indeed,
Varanasi, supra note 42, at 233.
See Rodgers et al., supra note 175, at 189-91 (stating that understanding the baseline
will aid in determining when there are ongoing injuries worthy of further damages under a
reopener provision).
203.
See Varanasi, supra note 191, at 257 (noting the funding limitations to frontloading
science); cf Tolan, supranote 99, at 422-26 (describing funding challenges for NRDA).
204.
33 U.S.C. § 2761 (a) (2) (2012).
205. Id.§2761(b)(1)(C).
206. Id. § 2671(C)(2)(E).
201.

202.
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Congress directed the Committee to establish a research program that
includes "[t]he collection of environmental baseline data in ecologically
sensitive areas at particular risk to oil discharges where such data are
insufficient." °7 In theory, these mandates are precisely in line with Dr.

Varanasi's call for frontloading science.
In reality, the Committee appears to have focused largely on research
related to oil pollution prevention and response technologies.2o8

For

example, the plan sets priorities in areas like testing of chemical dispersants
and alternative cleanup technologies, or facilities inspection and spill
detection technologies.209 To be sure, the plan also recognizes the need for
long-term monitoring programs in the wake of oil spills,2

°

but does not

specifically address Congress's vision of acquiring baseline data before a spill
occurs. The plan makes only one reference to pre-spill baseline data, and that
is in the context of efforts by the State of California to gather baseline data
for marine mammal and bird populations.211 The Committee is currently
working on a new plan.21

If the Committee continues to prioritize research other than baseline
studies, there are other levers that might be available to achieve a similar end.
One possibility is to use oil and gas leases as an ex ante lever for acquiring
baseline data collection. To that end, government agencies have the ability to
include various conditions in oil and gas leases or other regulatory permits
associated with offshore oil drilling activities.213 As a condition of their
permits, developers might be required to undertake the ongoing study of the
marine ecosystems in which they seek to do business.

207.

Id.§2761(c)( 4 )(A)(iv).

208.

See INTERAGENCY COORDINATING COMM. ON OIL POLLUTION RESEARCH, OIL POLLUTION

RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY PLAN, at iii (1997),

available at http://www.uscg.mil/iccopr/

files/Oil% 2oPollution% 2oResearch %2oand%2oTechnolOgy% 2oPlan %2o 997.pdf.
209. Id. ativ.
210.

Id. at6 4 .

211.

Id. atl7.

212. See Interagency Coordinating Comm. on Oil Pollution Research, Oil Pollution Research
and Technology Plan, U.S. COAST GUARD, http://www.uscg.mil/iccopr/DocumentsResearchAnid
TechnologyPlan.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
213. See43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012) (giving the Secretary of the Interior the authority to "at
any time prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he determines to be necessary and
proper in order to provide for the prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources
of the outer Continental Shelf'); id. § 1337(a) (1) (I) (giving the Secretary the authority to subject
leasing bids to any conditions that "the Secretary determines to be useful to accomplish the
purposes and policies of" the Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act); cf 30 U.S.C. § 22 6 (g) (2012)
(requiring, in the context of surface oil and gas leasing, the Secretary to determine "reclamation
and other actions as required in the interest of conservation of surface resources"); id. § 226(m)
(giving the Secretary of the Interior the authority to prescribe contract conditions "in his
discretion, the conservation of natural products or the public convenience or necessity may
require it or the interests of the United States may be best subserved thereby").
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Some of the oil and gas leasing statutes already require federal agencies
to engage in ongoing research on monitoring. The Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, for example, requires the Secretary of the Interior to engage in an
ongoing collection of baseline information that can be used to detect changes
to the quality of areas where leasing has been permitted:
Subsequent to the leasing and developing of any area or region,
the Secretary shall... monitor the human, marine, and coastal
environments of such area or region in a manner designed to
provide time-series and data trend information which can be
used for comparison with any previously collected data for the
purpose of identifying any significant changes in the quality and
productivity of such environments, for establishing trends in the
areas studied and monitored, and for designing experiments to
identify the causes of such changes.14
The inclusion of information-gathering obligations in permit leases would be
consistent with and further the existing data collection requirements that are
already contained in statutes like the Outer Continental Shelf Act.
In fact, these types of conditions are already being utilized in some cases.
For example, as a precondition to offshore oil exploration activities in the
Artic, "Shell was required to undertake extensive environmental monitoring
efforts in order to comply with a broad range of environmental protection
requirements-for example, the terms of EPA Clean Air Act and Clean Water
Act permits, as well as [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's]
marine mammal take authorizations."15 In part, Shell undertook efforts to
understand the physical and ecological characteristics in the area around the
proposed

drill

sites.21 6 The

research

included

monitoring

physical

oceanographic conditions, assessing water chemistry, and sampling biological
elements from phytoplankton to fishes.217 The purpose was to gain "an
understanding of pre-existing conditions and inter-annual variability."2 8 In a
report to the Secretary of the Interior, the Department of the Interior
anticipated that the "[i] nformation derived from these efforts is expected to
further the understanding of the local environment and help inform future
decision-making."219 If the investigative work and sampling performed by
214.

43 U.S.C. § 134 6(b); see also id. § 1346(a) (3) ("In addition to developing environmental

information, any study of an area or region, to the extent practicable, shall be designed to predict
impacts on the marine biota which may result from chronic low level pollution or large spills
associated with outer Continental Shelf production.").
215.

See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR: REVIEW OF

SHELL'S 2012 ALASKA OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ExPLORATION PROGRAM 27 (2013), available at

http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/Shell-report- 3 -8-13-Final.pdf.
216. Id.
217.

218.
219.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Shell were systemized over all offshore drilling activities and expanded to
continue throughout the duration of the projects, the knowledge of baseline
conditions of these areas might be greatly enhanced. Oil transport is obviously
a broader and more problematic geographic scope, but strategic study of the
most sensitive or nearshore ecosystems, as contemplated by Congress in OPA,
might be feasible.
As an alternative to requiring permit applicants like Shell to undertake
scientific study, another approach is simply to charge permit applicants a fee
that would be earmarked for government study of baseline conditions in areas
where oil drilling and transport take place. Such fees are not unprecedented.
Leaseholders under the Outer Continental Shelf Act, for example, already
pay fees into the Fishermen's Contingency Fund as a condition of their
lease.22o That fund was "to compensate U.S. fishermen whose vessels or fishing
gear have been lost, damaged, or destroyed by oil and gas obstructions on the
U.S. Outer Continental Shelf."2.
Using permit fees to fund government science programs and establish
baseline knowledge for at-risk marine ecosystems is an approach offered by
scholars who have more broadly examined this problem in other contexts.
For example, Professor Wendy Wagner has examined the "significant
deficiencies in scientific knowledge" that result from environmental laws that
impose elaborate licensing requirements but fail to hold private actors
accountable for producing basic scientific research necessary to
understanding the external social costs of their activities.22 To address this
deficit of knowledge, Professor Wagner has suggested that actors could be
asked to pay a modest fee to support government research regarding
externalities generated by the actor's work. Wagner explains "[t]he
underlying logic of this suggestion is that if actors are creating at least some
of the need for environmental research, they should assist it financially."223
Recently, President Obama announced plans to support long-term
research for fostering innovation in energy development through the
creation of an Energy Security Trust. That fund would use revenues from
federal oil and gas development to provide $2 billion for advanced energy

220.
43 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012) (establishing the Fishermen's Contingency Fund); 30 C.F.R.
§ 1218.152 (2014) (administering the Fishermen's Contingency Fund).
221.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION: NMFS's FISHERMEN'S CONTINGENCY FUND SHOULD BE REEXAMINED

(1999), available at http://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/NOAA-STD-i 1484-o8-1999.pdf.
222.
Wagner, supranote 19, at 1624; see id. at 1632 ("Although itis
rarely noticed, ignorance
regarding the harm that private actors are causing health and the environment is just another
external cost of their activities that they are able to pass on to society.").
223.
Id. at 1744; see also id. at 1632, n.31 (recommending "that 'public research costs' of
testing hazardous chemicals should be linked to their 'private economic origins'" (citing Lyndon,
2

supra note 156, at 1799)).
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research designed to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil.2,4 Others have
noted that the Energy Trust, which would use small user fees on current
energy production to meet larger government research and development
needs, has been successfully modeled before.25 In particular, the national
Highway Trust Fund levies "a small gas tax paid by current users of the
highway system" to raise necessary funds for maintaining the current system
and invest in the future infrastructure... 6 States like New York have
implemented similar charges on electricity usage to generate additional funds
for research and development of advanced power generation, storage,
transmission, and demand-response technologies.227
Like the Energy Trust Fund, the Fishermen's Contingency Fund, or the
Highway Trust Fund, fees collected through oil and gas leasing permits could
be used to create a "Baseline Data Fund." Such a fund, and the data collected
because of it, would benefit private industries as well as public entities.
Industries would benefit from the research because the aim is ultimately to
achieve a more complete understanding of long-term injuries. More complete
knowledge would encourage viable claims while making it easier to defeat
more speculative assertions of harm. Ideally, the funds would be aggregated
and made available to all sectors-government and private-to advance
science related to injury identification and disaster response before it
happens. A competitive application process aimed at coordinated study and
managed by an independent coalition of interdisciplinary scientists would
further aid the efficient and non-biased allocation of the funding resources.
In sum, whether through the establishment of a baseline data fund or
some other regulatory mechanism, filling the data gap regarding the baseline
scientific knowledge in the marine ecosystems in the heart of oil exploration
and drilling activities would alleviate some obstacles to understanding longterm harms. This knowledge would separate an entire category of scientific
assessment from the grips of the litigious NRDA process. It would also result
in the more efficient assessment of injuries following oil spills and provide a
basis for understanding the extent of long-term harms caused by oil spills, as
opposed to continuations of historic trends.

2 24.

Colleen Curtis, What You Need to Know About the Energy Security Trust, WHITE HOUSE BLOG

(Mar. 15, 2013, 11:35 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2o1 3 /0 3 /1 5 /what-you-need-knowabout-energy-security-trust; see also Andrew C. Revkin, A Closer Look at Obama'sPlan to Payfor Energy
Research with DrillingFees,N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2013, 2:04 PM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/
2013/03/1 9/a-closer-look-at-obamas-plan-to-pay-for-energy-research-with-drilling-fees/.
225. Jesse Jenkins, How Serious Are President Obama and Congressional Republicans About an
Energy Security Trust Fund?, ENERGY COLLECTIVE (Mar. 19, 2013), http://theenergycollective.

com/jessejenkins/200436/how-serious-are-president-obama-and-congressional-republicansabout-energy-secur.
226. Id.
227.

Id.
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A LONG-TERM MULTIPLIER

The creation of a baseline data fund and the coordinated collection of
baseline data is one possible way of supporting NRDA science and dampening
litigation noise. A second approach, the one discussed here, similarly
recommends separating some NRDA science from the adversarial context.
This solution, however, focuses on the particular challenges of long-term
injuries.
Recall that reopeners, while theoretically promising, may simply extend
the adversarial context of NRDA beyond settlement. In addition, the inherent
difficulty of proving long-term injury, combined with the narrowness of some
reopeners, may not provide trustees with any real opportunities for recovering
damages for long-term harms. And yet, one clear benefit of reopeners is that
they provide incentives to engage in the ongoing study of long-term injuries.
Reopeners also provide a sense of security for trustees pursuing early
settlement, which has the benefit of putting funds in the hands of trustees to
begin restoration. It is with these drawbacks and benefits in my mind that the
second proposed solution is crafted.
As noted, long-term injuries are notoriously difficult to prove and their
study in the NRDA context creates a divisive (almost toxic) schism within the
scientific literature. One way to avoid those problems would be to jettison the
reopener, and instead, invoke a multiplier to settle claims for long-term
injuries. Trustees, in other words, would be free to make natural resource
damage claims for acute injuries, following the normal NRDA process. For
long-term injuries-for example, those that are expected to extend beyond
settlement or litigation-the trustees collect some percentage of the original
settlement as compensation for future, unknown harms.
The magnitude of the multiplier might depend on a variety of factorslike the amount of oil spilled, the type of oil spilled, a rating of the pristineness
of the ecosystem before the spill (Prince William Sound would score higher,
and Gulf of Mexico lower), and the length of time between spill and
settlement (longer time with less multiplier because presumably more injuries
identified). At first, the multiplier might be fairly rough-cut given the nascent
state of information on long-term injuries. But, over time, as understanding
of long-term harms is refined, the matrix governing the multiplier would be
similarly refined. Multiplier tables would begin to resemble something like
actuarial tables.
Though admittedly a blunt instrument, a multiplier would avoid ongoing
litigation over long-term injuries. For trustees, it avoids the problems of
proving causation for harms with long-latency periods. For defendants, it
allows a real opportunity for closure and provides a basis for early settlement
without resort to a reopener provision.
Of course, one of the premises of this Article is that NRDA science is
useful and necessary to understanding the effects of chronic toxic exposure
on marine ecosystems. To the extent a multiplier removes the incentive to

2015]

ADVERSARIAL SCIENCE

1553

engage in ongoing, long-term scientific research, it may not be desirable from
a knowledge-enhancing perspective. The goal here is not to jettison the
science, but to create structures to free science from litigation. To best address
these concerns, multipliers should be coupled with an earmarking
provision-one that requires the additional funds created by the multiplier to
be used for funding long-term research and restoration efforts. In this way,
the multiplier is less as a penalty for unknown harms and more as an
obligation to fund future research of long-term harm in the spill area.
Multipliers are not new concepts. They are used in antitrust and RICO
statutes,22 8 and have been proposed by scholars in other contexts to ensure
that liability frameworks are properly reflecting and compensating the actual
injuries likely suffered by plaintiffs.29 To be sure, a multiplier for long-term

NRDA damages is not meant to impose a form of treble or extracompensatory damages. Rather, a multiplier would simply reflect, albeit in a
crude way, the actual long-term damages resulting from oil spills.
In my own work, I have previously suggested the use of multipliers to
remedy long-term ecological injuries, both because long-term injuries are
more substantial than previously thought, and because long-term injuries are
difficult to prove and not likely to be redressed if handled under the
traditional tort framework.23o This Article revives the notion of multipliers as
a simple way of avoiding the risk of setting scientific agendas in the shadow of
reopener provisions. In doing so, this Article offers an additional rationale for
adopting a multiplier, provides refinements to the multiplier solution, and
cautions that a multiplier should be coupled with an earmarking provision, so
that long-term research is undertaken in the wake of oil spills and other toxic
releases.
C. EXPANDING REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS AND RULE ii CERTIFICATIONS

So far, the solutions discussed offer ways of dampening the influence of
litigation by taking science outside the adversarial context. Through methods
of avoidance, these solutions help legitimize NRDA science by decoupling the
scientific inquiry from at least part of the litigation frame. But avoiding the
influence of litigation on science is not always possible. And, if we accept that
See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
A. Mitchell Polinsky &Steven Shavell, PunitiveDamages:An Economic Analysis, i ii HARV.
L. REV. 869, 874 (1998) ("When an injurer has a chance of escaping liability, the proper level of
228.
229.

total damages to impose on him, if he is found liable, is the harm caused multiplied by the

reciprocal of the probability of being found liable."); Catherine M. Sharkey, PunitiveDamages as
Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003) (urging the use of extra-compensatory societal
damages as a means of achieving optimal deterrence); see also Ciraolo v. City of New York, 2 16
F.3 d 236, 245 (2d. Cir. 2000) (CalabresiJ., concurring) (recognizing that a multiplier concept
of punitive damages is "not new"). See generally Anthony J. Sebok, Deterrence or Disgorgement?:

ReadingCiraolo After Campbell, 64 MD. L. REV. 541 (2005) (assembling literature on proposals
for multipliers).
23o. Knudsen, supra note 22, at 496-99; Knudsen, supra note 173, at 125-27.
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adversarial science is no more prone to abuse than other forms of regulatory
science, or if we agree that adversarial science is an important informational
asset, then devising solutions that simply avoid adversarial science may not be
desired or necessary.
Because the goal is to increase the quality of adversarial science and
neutralize perceptions of bias, solutions that use litigation controls to directly
address legitimacy concerns should also be considered. In particular, such
solutions would provide direct structural reform by developing procedures
that address the issues of transparency or manufactured uncertainty described
in Part III. At least two possibilities come to mind-expanding the use of
rebuttable presumptions and tailoring Rule 11 certifications to science.
In the NRDA process, rebuttable presumptions already exist. The OPA
regulations give a rebuttable presumption of validity to any damage
assessment made by government trustees that is prepared in accordance with
procedures set out in the regulations.231 To address the problems of
transparency and asymmetry identified in Part III.C, regulators could expand
this already existing presumption to private science. Namely, they could make
a rebuttable presumption of credibility available to privately-funded science if
the funding party-usually the corporate defendant or other potentially
responsible party ("PRP") -makes certain disclosures and certifications.
Conversely, a presumption against validity might be imposed absent such a
disclosure statement. For example, the funding party might be required to
certify that the complete portfolio of relevant science undertaken in response
to the incident has been released. The use of a presumption to encourage full
disclosure even absent formal discovery would help address problems
associated with the selective release of scientific studies that exclusively
support the PRP's litigation position. The broader body of science emerging
from the NRDA process would benefit from the full range of information
undertaken in response to the toxic release.
To be perfectly symmetrical, a similar disclosure statement should also
be required of government-funded science, though there are at least public
information laws like the Freedom of Information Act2ss that make public
disclosure of government science less problematic.33 Nonetheless, in the

231.
See 15 C.F.R. § 990.13 (2014) ("Anydetermination or assessment of damages to natural
resources made by a Federal, State, or Indian trustee in accordance with this part shall have the
force and effect of a rebuttable presumption.").
232-. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
233. For more information on the availability of government-funded science through public
disclosure laws, see ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 4 29 8 3 , PUBLIC ACCESS TO DATA
FROM FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH: PROVISIONS IN OMB CIRCULAR A-s s o (20 3). According to

the Congressional Research Service Report on government-funded science: "Before 1999,
academic and nonprofit performers of such research were permitted but not required to make
their data available to the public through provisions of the Freedom of Information Act ....In
October 1998, a provision in P.L. 105-277 changed that, requiring that such data be made

publicly available." Id. at i. The particular litigation context of NRDA proceedings may alter the
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adversarial context, given the goal of decreasing perceptions of bias and selfinterest, applying disclosure requirements to both parties would be advisable.
In this way, the presumption and disclosure proposed here would resemble
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a). Ultimately, the goal is to create
incentives of transparency, which aids scientific discovery.54
One can imagine complementary requirements as well. For example, for
any science withheld from the disclosure process, perhaps for reasons that the
studies are incomplete or have not produced credible results, could be listed
on a science log much in the same way that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require litigating parties to produce privilege logs detailing
discovery documents that have been withheld for reasons of attorney-client
privilege or the work product doctrine.2s5
Rebuttable presumptions, of course, might also be used in other creative
ways, not limited to issues of disclosure. For example, presumptions of validity
could attach to scientific studies submitted for third-party peer review. Again,
this type of presumption might attach to both government-funded and
privately-funded science. This type of presumption would track the Daubert
factors applied to expert scientific testimony proferred at trial.236
In addition to rebuttable presumptions, there are other litigation
controls that could clarify the science that emerges from adversarial contexts.
Rule i I certifications and sanctions, for example, might be expanded or
tailored to address issues of adversarial science. Consider the incentives that
defendants have to generate uncertainty on scientific issues-the greater the
perceived uncertainty, the less likely the injured party is able to prove their
claims. As described in Part III.C, these incentives to generate uncertainty can
unnecessarily lead to confusion in the scientific literature and result in
damaging personal attacks on the credibility of scientists. Of course, one of
the tenets of scientific discovery is questioning existing discourse on matters
of health, biology, and ecology. The ability to question science in the pursuit
of truth should undoubtedly be safeguarded. At the same time, attacks on
science for political or litigious gain are damaging to the pursuit of knowledge
and ought to be discouraged.
In the litigation context, unwanted and damaging behaviors can be
discouraged through the threat of sanctions. Rule i of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure discourages frivolous litigation and unduly oppressive
litigation tactics by requiring attorneys to certify that any motions or pleadings

requirements. In the NRDA context, not all science may be obtainable through FOIA requests if

the government trustees chose to invoke a FOIA exemption for "information compiled for law
enforcement purposes," the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to interfere with

enforcement proceedings." 5 U.S.C. §
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2 (b) (7).

234.

See supranotes 58-63 and accompanying text.

235.

FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)( 5 ) (A).

236.

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
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presented to the court are not advanced for an "improper purpose."37
Attorneys further certify that their "factual contentions have evidentiary
support."3 8 By certifying their written papers, attorneys and their clients are
subject to sanctions for advancing unfounded certifications.39
While these general certifications would certainly cover factual
contentions rooted in science, it is worth considering whether a rule
expanded or tailored specifically to science could prove useful. In particular,
consider that the perception of bias in adversarial science can undermine its
usefulness outside the courtroom. To that end, litigation controls that are
particularly aimed at holding scientists to a type of fiduciary duty might be
useful in neutralizing perceptions of bias. One might imagine the expansion
of penalties for unfounded attacks on science or particular Rule i i-like
certifications for arguments attacking scientific veracity. One could also
imagine particular certifications to accompany affidavits, declarations, or
expert testimony offered by scientists-reminding these experts of their
primary role as scientists, not advocates.
Given that science produced or attacked in the courtroom could have
ramifications for scientific understanding outside the courtroom, we might
even hold lawyers or scientists to a greater degree of accountability when
certifying that science created or questioned in the litigation context is being
done so in good faith. In other words, in the realm of science, we might wish
to extend that expectation to be clear that scientific claims and attacks on
science are more than simply nonfrivolous-they are well-founded. An
obvious downside to these certifications or targeted sanctions would be a
chilling effect. Nonetheless, the idea would simply be to give added weight to
the already existing expectation that factual arguments are nonfrivolous.
VI. CONCLUSION

Adversarial science conjures images of bias, agenda-driven outcomes, and
the funding effect. And though adversarial science may not be more prone to
manipulation than other forms of policy-relevant science, it bears a special
branding and evokes a particular skepticism by scholars and courts. But it does
not have to be this way.
With the right support, adversarial science can be embraced. Indeed it
needs to be embraced, at least so long as existing regulatory regimes
systematically fail to study long-term toxic exposure. For some toxic releases,
like oil spills, the NRDA process offers a unique and important chance to
study ecosystems and long-term impacts of toxic exposure. Casting NRDA
science aside simply because of its adversarial origins, therefore, would be a
mistake.

237.
238.
239.
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While this Article examines the nuances of adversarial science in the
NRDA context, the opportunities of adversarial science go beyond NRDA. In
any area where adversarial science fills an informational void, that science has
the potential to inform public policy outside the narrow confines of the
courtroom. The utility of adversarial science, however, depends on whether
the science is perceived as legitimate. If the science is laden with bias, or even
if it is assumed to be unreliable, opportunities for learning will be missed.
Fortunately, adversarial science, more so than other forms of policyrelevant science, exists within a tightly-controlled structure and amidst
evidentiary and discovery rules designed to achieve just outcomes. In this way,
legitimizing adversarial science may be an easier task than regulating policyrelevant science in the regulatory context. Discovery tools, for instance, can
smooth transparency problems between private science and government
science. In addition, cross-examination or active engagement of scientific
issues through briefing provides a confrontational form of peer review that
the academic or regulatory process does not.
If used in the right way, these and other litigation tools can be used to
harness the promise of adversarial science. For instance, courts might
consider allowing rebuttable presumptions in favor of reliability if a party
certifies that all relevant science has been released, or if a party conducts its
studies using methods that reduce bias, like double-blind studies and funding.
In this way, the use of traditional litigation controls like presumptions could
especially help smooth out imbalances in transparency between governmentfunded and privately-funded science. Uniformly imposing these kinds of
procedural controls would be possible through amendments to rules of
evidence. For NRDA or other statutory causes of action, agency regulations
can also impose controls.
Whether or not the ideas explored in this Article lead to reform in the
courtroom, the rules of evidence, or NRDA regulations, the issues this Article
raises certainly have implications for the ongoing NRDA process in the wake
of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. For government trustees, the exploration of
reopener provisions in this Article ought to influence how the trustees
structure settlements for long-term injuries and whether they choose to
include a reopener provision. In addition, this Article's demonstration of
funding effect and other conflicts of interest in NRDA science ought to
encourage BP and other private parties to self-impose structural tools, like
voluntary disclosure, to overcome perceptions of bias. If these perceptions can
be overcome, the credibility of the science will be strengthened and lawyers
can better leverage it to influence the settlement process.

